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Defining Crime, Delegating Authority - How Different are Administrative Crimes? 
Daniel Richman1     
 
Abstract: As the Supreme Court reconsiders whether Congress can so freely provide for criminal enforcement of agency 
rules, this Essay assesses the critique of administrative crimes though a Federal Criminal Law lens. And it explores 
the extent to which this critique carries over to other instances of mostly well-accepted, delegated federal criminal 
lawmaking - to courts, states, foreign governments, and international institutions. By considering these other delegations 
through the lens of the administrative crime critique, the Essay destabilizes that critique’s doctrinal foundations. It 
then suggests that if one really cares about not the abstract “liberty” said to be protected by the separation of powers, 
but the lived “liberty” gained through careful and accountable criminal lawmaking, free from the pathologies that have 
bedeviled federal criminal law for more than a century, then administrative crimes are normatively quite attractive. 
 
Although -- putting aside drug cases -- they comprise a relatively small fraction of the federal 
criminal prosecutions brought each year,2 a number of remarkably varied defendants are regularly 
charged with criminal offenses that were largely defined by administrative agencies -- executive or 
independent.  The inside trader charged with violating the SEC’s Rule 10b-5; the drug trafficker in 
newer and ever more dangerous substances; the violator of Iranian sanctions; the obstructive 
immigration policy protestors at a senator’s office;3 the greedy hoarders of personal protective 
equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic4 -- each has been charged based on a Congressional 
delegation of substantial criminal lawmaking authority to a bureaucratic process.  
 
While the Supreme Court has occasionally looked askance at these “administrative crimes,” they 
remain a well-accepted feature of federal criminal law,5 albeit one strongly condemned by those 
 
1 Paul J. Kellner Professor, Columbia Law School. Huge Thanks to Tom Merrill, Kate Stith, Michael Dreeben, Jeremy 
Kessler, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Sam Buell, Sarah Seo, Peter Strauss, Mike Park, Daphne Renan, Stephen Smith, John 
Rappaport, Payvand Ahdout, Gillian Metzger, Miriam Baer, Lori Damrosch, Alexandra Bowie, Alex Raskolnikov, and 
attendees at a Columbia workshop for extremely helpful comments, and Ben Covington, for extraordinary research 
assistance. 
2 Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report, Fiscal 2019, tbl. 3A at 11 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1285951/download (noting of 69,412 defendants charged in fiscal 2019, 
30,665 immigration cases; 13,704 drug cases; and 15,899 violence cases); Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking 
Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 Emory L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (noting that drug cases comprised 30% of 
federal prosecutions in 2011). 
3 United States v. Gosar, Case Nos. 19-306; 19-307; 19-308; 19-313; 19-315; 19-320, 2020 WL 231083 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 
15, 2020) (protest at Senator Cantwell’s office relating to immigration detention centers); see also United States v. 
Mumford, 2017 WL 652449, *3-4 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 2017) (prosecution for causing disturbance in federal courthouse); 
United States v. Komatsu,18-cr-651 (ST) (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 4, 2019) (same) 
4 Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Application for Arrest Warrants, United States v. Bulloch, No. 20-MJ-327 (filed 
E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1271741/download (prosecution for 
accumulating with intent to resell for excessive profit surgical masks that had been designated by the President as “scarce 
and critical material” under the Defense Production Act). 
5 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768–74 (1996) (finding appropriate congressional delegation to President to 
set aggravating factors in capital murder cases trial under military law). In Loving, the Court found “no absolute rule . . . 
against Congress' delegation of authority to define criminal punishments.,” and noted: “We have upheld delegations 
whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal, so long as 
Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations ‘confin[e] 
themselves within the field covered by the statute.’” Id. at 768 (first quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 
518 (1911); then citing  Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160 (1991)).  
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worried about the anti-democratic creep of the Administrative State.6 This acceptance, however, may 
soon change.  Last Term, in Gundy v. United States, a plurality of the Court found no violation of 
longstanding delegation principles in the criminal prosecution of a defendant for violating 
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA).7  The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined a scorching dissent by 
Justice Gorsuch that opened: 
 
The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected representatives may adopt new 
federal laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that design. It purports to 
endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal code 
governing the lives of a half-million citizens. Yes, those affected are some of the least 
popular among us. But if a single executive branch official can write laws restricting the 
liberty of this group of persons, what does that mean for the next?8  
 
Justice Alito, while finding the plurality’s specific application of nondelegation doctrine 
unobjectionable, noted: “If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have 
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”9  While Justice Kavanagh took no part in 
the case, he later noted that Gorsuch’s dissent “raised important points.”10 
 
Whether or not a majority favors recalibrating or jettisoning the “intelligible principle” standard for 
assessing delegations in general remains to be seen.11 Nor did Gorsuch’s analysis in Gundy call out 
delegations of criminal lawmaking authority for special, more searching, scrutiny.12 It is indeed 
possible that some of those joining the dissent, particularly the Chief Justice, are more concerned 
with regulatory delegation generally, and not criminal delegation specifically.  Yet Gorsuch’s own 
position is quite clear, and it is not surprising that concerns about delegations often sound loudest in 
the criminal context (at least when national security is not implicated), where liberty interests are 
greatest and governmental authority most scrutinized.  Indeed before coming to the Court and in 
the context of yet another SORNA case, Gorsuch wrote that “[i]t’s easy enough to see why a stricter 
rule” than the “intelligible principle” analysis “would apply in the criminal arena.”13  He explained: 
 
The criminal conviction and sentence represent the ultimate intrusions on 
personal liberty and carry with them the stigma of the community’s collective 
condemnation — something quite different than holding someone liable for 
 
6 See Brenner M. Fissell, When Agencies Make Criminal Law, 10 UC Irvine L. Rev. 855 (2020); Philip Hamburger, Is 
Administrative Law Unlawful (2014). 
7 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2129–30 (2019) (concurrence) (Kagan, J.) 
8 Id. at 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
9 Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
10 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of cert.). 
11 See Kristin E. Hickman, Gundy, Nondelegation, and Never-Ending Hope, The Regulatory Review, July 8, 2019; 
Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. __ (2021) (assessing 
future of Gundy dissent). 
12 See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107 Va. L. Rev. at *4 (2020). 
(“None of the opinions in the case asked whether Congress’s ability to delegate policy decisions ought to be assessed 
differently when the power being delegated is the power to determine the scope of criminal laws.”). 
13 United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672-73 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc), 
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016). 
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a money judgment because he turns out to be the lowest cost avoider. . . . Indeed, the law 
routinely demands clearer legislative direction in the criminal context than it 
does in the civil and it would hardly be odd to think it might do the same 
here. . . . When it comes to legislative delegations we’ve seen, too, that the framers’ attention 
to the separation of powers was driven by a particular concern about individual liberty and 
even more especially by a fear of endowing one set of hands with the power to create and 
enforce criminal sanctions. And might not that concern take on special 
prominence today, in an age when federal law contains so many crimes — and 
so many created by executive regulation — that scholars no longer try to keep 
count and actually debate their number?14 
 
It thus doesn’t take much tea-leaf reading to expect that, amid a general reconsideration of the 
Administrative State,15 the Court will be returning to the issue of administrative crimes soon.  Any 
serious confrontation of that issue, however, requires a broader consideration of many aspects of 
Federal Criminal Law, for it turns out that administrative agencies are not the only entities to which 
Congress has dynamically delegated the power to define crimes -- the power to, on an on-going 
basis, establish the criminal offenses that federal prosecutors are empowered to charge.   
 
Delegation indeed abounds in federal criminal law, going far beyond that to agencies and 
departments that are the usual grist of nondelegation doctrine discussions. Even as federal courts 
assiduously speak in statutory interpretation terms, a clear-eyed view of the role courts play in giving 
content to common-law terms; setting the scope of accessorial and entity liability; defining defenses; 
setting mens rea terms; and defining liability under criminal civil rights and antitrust statutes cannot 
avoid speaking in delegation terms.  Dynamic delegation to state legislatures sets the elements of 
numerous federal criminal offenses, and, when there are gaps in federal coverage,16 state penal law is 
incorporated wholesale under the Assimilative Crimes Act. Even foreign law -- on such matters as 
wildlife regulation and bribery -- can be the basis of criminal prosecutions under several federal 
criminal statutes.  The inclusion of marijuana on a Controlled Substances Act schedule was in part 
pursuant to an international treaty. And to define the federal piracy offense, courts look to the “law 
of nations.” 
 
The goal of this essay is largely positive.  It seeks to assess the critique of administrative crimes not 
through an administrative law lens but a Federal Criminal Law one. To what extent does this critique 
carry over to other instances of mostly well-accepted, delegated, criminal lawmaking? Does doctrinal 
acceptance of formal or effective delegations to states, courts, foreign nations, perhaps even 




15 See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2017) 
(noting “With Justice Gorsuch on the Court, some constitutionally rooted pullback in deference doctrines appears 
increasingly likely.”). 
16 See Nikhil Bhagat, Note, Filling the Gap? Non-Abrogation Provisions and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 111 Colum. 
L. Rev. 77, 103 n.153 (2011) (collecting cases on whether agency regulations constitute an “enactment of Congress” for 
purposes of the ACA). 
17 For a tour of contexts in which federal criminal lawmaking has been delegated, see Daniel C. Richman, Kate Stith & 
William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes, chap. 12 (2d ed. 2019). 
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As a normative matter, this essay is neither a full-throated defense of delegation nor a devastating 
rejoinder to those who question it.  A critic of administrative crime might, for instance, stick to her 
guns and flatly condemn every non-congressionally defined criminal offense. But the plan is, first, to 
ring changes on the delegation theme, exploring the broad variety of partners that Congress has 
recruited to the federal criminal lawmaking project.  Then, by applying the administrative crime 
critique to these delegations, I plan, as a positive matter, to destabilize that critique’s doctrinal 
foundations.  
 
From a broader perspective of federal criminal law, however, a powerful normative point does 
emerge: If one really cares, not about the abstract “liberty” said to be protected by the separation of 
powers, but the lived “liberty” gained through careful and accountable criminal lawmaking, free 
from the pathologies that have bedeviled Federal Criminal Law for more than a century, then 
administrative crimes are promising indeed, as is crime definition by any number of legislative 
sources other than Congress.  Put differently, once one considers Congress’ track record and the 
strategic action of federal prosecutors, criminal law may be a special case for nondelegation doctrine.  
But not in the way that Justice Gorsuch and critics of administrative crimes suggest. 
 
This article will start, in Part I, by exploring the contours of the challenge to the sweep, even 
legitimacy, of administrative crimes.  On what constitutional or jurisprudential principles have these 
challenges been based?  The most straightforward and simple critique is based on the structure of 
the Constitution. In a world in which Legislative Powers have been vested in Congress, and 
Legislative Supremacy is constantly hailed as the touchstone to Federal Criminal Law, why should it 
be acceptable for Congress to abdicate its responsibilities and delegate constitutional authority lying 
at the core of sovereign powers? The critique draws yet more power from the very nature of 
criminal law, which is supposed to represent some authoritative community condemnation, not a 
bureaucratic promulgation.   
 
In Part II, I turn to the reality of federal criminal law, in which Congress has delegated sweeping 
crime definition powers -- often explicitly but sometimes implicitly -- to a variety of governmental 
institutions that are far less responsive to Congress than are federal agencies. I consider how, to 
varying degrees, these powers are exercised by federal courts; states; foreign nations, and 
international institutions (or norms), and I explore the extent to which these delegations find (or 
don’t find) justification in rationales that immunize them from the administrative crimes critique. 
Moreover, these delegated crime definition powers, like those to agencies, are conditional on the 
exercise of an extraordinary delegation that Gorsuch’s critique leaves unscathed: the delegation to 
federal prosecutors of absolute gatekeeping power over the bringing of criminal charges, and 
unreviewable control over which legally applicable offenses will charge.18 
 
Finally, in Part III, I reconsider the normative appeal of administrative crimes once they are placed 
in the context not just of prosecutorial authority but of the political economy of federal criminal 
legislation, which has been extraordinarily resistant to change. Not only is it highly questionable that 
the elimination of administrative crimes -- which to prosecutors are often mere items on a longer 
menu -- would change the mix of defendants actually prosecuted, but any such curtailment would 
 
18 See Daniel M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev.. 469 (1996); Daniel C. 
Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757 (1999); 
Hessick & Hessick, Delegation at 46. 
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considerably reduce the specificty and clarity of federal criminal law.  Embrace of formal “liberty” 
values along the lines of Justice Gorsuch’s critique would likely come at the expense of actual liberty. 
 
II. Critique of Administrative Crimes 
 
A. Administrative Crimes 
 
Those condemning the creep of “overcriminalization” in federal criminal law regularly decry the 
impossibility of determining the precise number of criminal offenses and point to the number of 
regulatory violations that can amount to crimes as a key cause of this indeterminacy.19  And it is 
certainly true, as Darryl Brown has noted, that “willful violations of civil regulation are routinely and 
innumerably defined as crimes.”20 
 
Consider United States v. Grimaud,21 which, in 1911, established that Congress could “delegate power 
to an agency to adopt regulations subject to criminal penalties, provided that Congress itself 
legislated the penalties.”22 In 1897, Congress authorized, initially, the Interior Department and, later, 
the Agriculture Department “to adopt rules regulating the “occupancy and use” of public forests to 
protect them from “destruction” and “depredations.”23 Violation of these rules could be pursued 
either criminally or civilly.  When the Forest Service found civil injunctions inadequate, it prevailed 
on the Justice Department to replead regulatory violations as criminal indictments.  And so a 
California shepherd who violated forest grazing rules found himself charged with a misdemeanor.24  
Upholding the charges, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Secretary of Agriculture had simply 
acted within the scope of his delegation when promulgating the rules, and the violation of these 
rules had been “made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress.”25 
 
Grimaud licensed the broad and varied regime that exists today.26 Thus, section 32 of the 1934 
Exchange Act made violation of certain rules promulgated by the Securities & Exchange 
 
19 Michael B. Mukasey & Paul J. Larkin, J., The Perils of Overcriminalization 2, Heritage Found.: Legal Memo (Feb. 12, 
2015), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/LM146.pdf; Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: 
Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Rule of Law, 15 Engage: J. Federalist Soc’y Prac. Groups 
14 (2014), https://fedsoc-cms public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/7KYhKjjxOLT0n6wrwvJ8BpPNLkH8JeLkki 
wRPeow.pdf. 
20 Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph Over Administrative Law, 7 J. L. Econ. & Pol’y  657, 664 
(2011) (“[I]nstead of civil sanctions and administrative remedies replacing criminal ones, criminal law continues to 
duplicate and supplement administrative law so pervasively in regulatory regimes, that criminal offenses accompany civil 
ones, and willful violations of civil regulation are routinely and innumerably defined as crimes.”) 
21 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
22 Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn T. Watts, Agency Rules with Force of Law, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 501-02 (2002). 
23 Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 522. 
24 See Logan Sawyer, Grazing, Grimaud, and Gifford Pinchot: How the Forest Service Overcame the Classical 
Nondelegation Doctrine to Establish Administrative Crimes, 24 J.L. & Pol. 171 (2008). 
25 Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 522 
26 Grimaud was foreshadowed by In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 533 (1896) (upholding conviction for selling margarine 
without complying with labelling rules set by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and noting “[t]he criminal offence 
[was] fully and completely defined by the act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and 
brands to be used was a mere matter of detail”); see Mark D. Alexander, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the 
Administrative Crime , 77 Cornell L. Rev. 612, 617-18 (1992). 
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Commission into federal crimes punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment.”27 Among these is 
Rule 10b-5, which is regularly charged in securities fraud cases, most notably those involving insider 
trading. The Ocean Dumping Act makes it a criminal offense to “knowingly violat[e] any provision 
of this subchapter, [or] any regulation promulgated under this subchapter.”28 Indeed, “Congress 
regularly passes statutes that delegate to an agency the power to promulgate regulations, while 
providing that violations of the yet to be written regulations will be crimes subject to statutory 
penalties.”29 Quite a few of these offenses, dynamically incorporating agency rules, are 
misdemeanors,30 but many, like securities fraud, are punished quite severely.  
 
B. Nature of Critique  
 
The historical unwillingness31 of the Supreme Court to find any delegation before it to lack the 
requisite “intelligible principle” has long been noted, and complained about by those on and off the 
Court.32 As will be seen, it is impossible to fully separate the issue of administrative crimes from the 
more general scholarly, and to some extent, judicial debate about whether closer judicial scrutiny of 
all congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies is appropriate.33  Yet this Article 
will try mightily to do so both because it offers no special perspective on that larger debate, and 
because I do not foresee the Court implementing an across-the-board nondelegation doctrine with 
teeth.  Gundy, however, may well presage a re-examination of Grimaud and its progeny, and the issue 
of administrative crimes seems well worth peeling off for separate treatment to the extent possible.   
 
For an extended elaboration of the sins of delegating specifically criminal lawmaking authority to 
agencies, the most useful sources are recent pieces by Andrew and Carissa Hessick,34 and by Brenner 
Fissell.35 Foundational to this critique are, appropriately, basic doctrines placing substantive and 
procedural limits on criminal laws.  A long line of cases rejecting the existence of a common law of 
 
27 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 32, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff).  
28 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2012); see Fissell at 860-61 for this and other examples. 
29 Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don't Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1849, 1852 (2011). 
30 See, e.g., Grimaud, 220 U.S.  at 509; 40 U.S.C. § 1315(c) (“Law enforcement authority of Secretary of Homeland 
Security for protection of public property”) (maximum punishment of 30 days for violation of GSA rules). 
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000) (stating the nondelegation doctrine 
has had “one good year and [over 200] bad ones,” since the Supreme Court’s only two invalidations of statutes on 
nondelegation grounds came in 1935); cf. Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 382–83, 417–29 (2017) (arguing, based on a dataset of 2500 federal and state supreme 
court decisions in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries, that “[t]here was no golden age in which the courts 
enforced a robust nondelegation doctrine”). 
32 See William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Constitutional Argument, 92 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 2107, 2108-15 (2017); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 333 (2002); Philip 
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 377-402 (2014); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal 
Administrative Law, 10 N.Y.U. J L. & Liberty 475, 491–93 (2016); see also Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, 
Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. __ (2021) (citing other sources); Metzger, supra, at 22–24 (describing 
criticisms of delegation levied by Justices Thomas and Alito).  
33 For an excellent overview of the debate, see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. 
Rev. 852, 858-82 (2020). 
34 Hessick & Hessick, supra 
35 Fissell, supra.  
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crimes provides support for a rule of absolute legislative control in this area.36  This separation of 
powers analysis not only would protect criminal law from non-Congressional incursions but would 
make Congress squarely accountable for it.37 
 
The unique nature of criminal law is captured by the “rule of lenity,” under which statutory 
ambiguities are to be construed in favor of criminal defendants.38 As Dan Kahan has noted, this rule   
“is best understood as a ‘nondelegation doctrine’”39 peculiar to the liberty interests implicated by 
criminal statutes. In other spheres, Congress might be permitted to legislate in broad strokes, leaving 
other government actors to fill in the details. But by “compel[ing] legislatures to detail the breadth of 
prohibitions in advance of their enforcement,” as Zachary Price explains, the rule of lenity ensures 
that Congress is wholly accountable to voters when criminalizing conduct.40  
 
Coming at the issue from a different angle is the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which demands that a 
criminal law “clearly define the conduct it prescribes,”41 not only to prevent inappropriate legislative 
delegation but to give notice to citizens and avoid arbitrary enforcement.  If this doctrine’s objects 
of analysis are statutes broadly providing that violations of rules promulgated by an agency are 
criminal offenses (and not, say, the rules themselves) the relevant “laws” will often be troublingly 
vague indeed.  Moreover, the argument goes, standard administrative law doctrines counselling 
judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes (Chevron)42  and its own 
regulations43(Auer/Kisor) make matters even worse, if they are allowed to override the criminal law 
default of lenity.44 
 
Separation of powers promotes not merely accountability but liberty itself.45  A second aspect of that 
principle is less about who makes the laws than ensuring that legislative power is quite separate from 
prosecutorial power. In Gundy, Gorsuch drew particular attention to the fact that the Justice 
Department had both promulgated the rule being enforced criminally and chose to enforce it against 
Gundy.  Yet the self-dealing problem goes beyond cases where the promulgating and the enforcing 
agency are the same. Madison’s point -- “There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive 
 
36 Hessick & Hessick at 21 (quoting cases); see United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, 
C.J.); (“[T]he power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the 
Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”). 
37 See Harlan S. Abrahams & John R. Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative Crimes: A Study of 
Irreconcilables, 1 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1976) (separation of powers doctrine precludes agencies from making criminal 
law). 
38 See Richman, Stith, & Stuntz, at 97 (on “so-called rule of lenity”). 
39 Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 347. 
40 Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885, 887 (2004). 
41 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
42 See Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (suggesting “Chevron has no role to play in the interpretation of criminal statutes”), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 
(2017); Patrick J. Glen & Kate E. Stillman, Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity? Dual-Use Statutes and Judge 
Sutton’s Lonely Lament, 77 Ohio St. L.J. Furthermore 129, 137–38 (2016); Kristin Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and 
KPMG, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 905 (2007). 
43 See Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of 
Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 184 (2019). 
44 See Guedes v. BATF, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.) (statement) (noting Chevron “has no role to play when 
liberty is at stake”). 
45 See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1534 (1991). 
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powers are united in the same person” -- can easily extend to the argument that liberty is best 
protected when a coincidence of the policies of two different branches is a prerequisite for 
prosecution.46  Adherence to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment not only inherently 
limits the supply of laws generally, but ensures that a body whose members might fear overreaching 
prosecutions of themselves and their friends passes on all criminal laws.47  It also slows the rate of 
legal change, since “agencies can change laws more quickly than Congress can.”48 
 
Hessick & Hessick go further and suggest that reasons like “expertise, compromise, and efficiency”  
“that are traditionally offered in support of broad delegations to agencies do not support—or at 
least do not strongly support—delegations in the criminal law.”49  A specialized expertise 
justification resting on an agency's use of objective data and methodologies does not extend, Hessick 
& Hessick suggest, to the moral judgments or even utilitarian calculi that ought to be at the heart of 
criminal lawmaking.  Agencies, they argue, lack 
 
relevant expertise in determining the costs and benefits of criminal sanctions. Their expertise 
is in the substantive area that they regulate—such as the environment, the securities markets, 
and the airwaves. They do not specialize in determining either the benefits of criminal 
prohibitions to potential victims and communities or the costs of criminal convictions to 
offenders, their families and communities, and the department of prisons.50 
 
Perhaps the most damning critique of administrative crimes arises out of the very nature of criminal 
law, which, at least in a liberal democracy, is supposed to express the moral condemnation of 
specific conduct by the community, speaking through its representatives. Fissell notes: “The insight 
of expressivist punishment theory is that the symbolic communication of condemnation must come 
from the community and that therefore the duties imposed by criminal law must be determined by a 
democratic institution.”51  Bureaucratic condemnation is no substitute, even where an agency is 
supposedly “accountable” to the legislature.52 
 
C. Scope of Critique    
 
The forgoing critique could support a categorical condemnation of criminal offenses defined by 
administrative agencies.53  Yet Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent suggested that executive agencies 
could play a limited, factfinding role in crime-definition.54  Even the needed reform of the 
“intelligible principle” standard, he noted, would leave the analysis in Touby v. United States55 -- which 
 
46 Hessick & Hessick at 25-26 (quoting The Federalist No. 47). 
47 Id at 27. 
48 Id. at 35. 
49 Id at 39. 
50 Id. at 41. 
51 Fissell, supra, at 891 
52 Id at 893-95. 
53 Hessick & Hessick, supra, at 54. 
54 See Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of 
Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 184 (2019) (noting that this principle “requires a theory 
that distinguishes between presidential ‘factfinding’ and presidential ‘policymaking’”). 
55 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991). 
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upheld the Attorney General’s ability to temporarily schedule a controlled substance -- largely 
undisturbed.56   
 
In Touby, the defendant, prosecuted for manufacturing temporarily-scheduled “Euphoria,” claimed 
unconstitutional delegation, arguing “that something more than an “intelligible principle” is required 
when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal 
sanctions.”57 Noting that its “cases are not entirely clear on the point,” the Court found the statutory 
provision “passes muster even if greater congressional specificity is required in the criminal 
context.”58 While the Court addressed only the Attorney General’s temporary scheduling powers, 
lower courts have found its analysis a fortiori applies to the more rigorous permanent scheduling 
process, and that “collateral attacks are not permitted in criminal cases involving permanent 
scheduling orders.”59 Since very significant sentencing consequences follow from the scheduling of a 
drug at a particular level, the Controlled Substances Act comes close indeed to authorizing crime 
definition by the very Department in charge of prosecutions.  Yet this, the most frequently charged 
administrative crime, would apparently survive Gorsuch’s scrutiny.60 
 
Gorsuch also seemed open to delegations that “at least arguably, implicate[] the president’s inherent 
Article II authority.”61  His reference “at least arguably” might be taken as a quiet acceptance of a 
line of cases, recently noted by Alexander Volokh, allowing Congress to “delegate without an 
intelligible principle even when the delegate lacks inherent power, as long as the subject matter of 
the delegation is interlinked with an area where the delegate does have inherent power.”62 Thus 
extended, the executive power to define crimes, or at least substantially contribute to crime 
definition, would easily encompass the President’s devising aggravating factors in capital murder 
cases tried under military law;63 the executive designation of “foreign terrorist organizations” that 
someone can be prosecuted for providing “material assistance” to,64 and the President’s ability to 
promulgate sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that, if violated, can 
be prosecuted criminally.65  Presumably, the prosecution of hoarders of personal protective 
equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic66 would similarly pass muster, as the sweeping terms of 
 
56 139 S Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
57 500 U.S. at 165-66. 
58 Id. at 166. 
59 United States v. Forrester, 616 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Carlson, 87 F.3d 440, 446 (11th 
Cir.1996). 
60 See supra note __ (collecting sources on annual number of federal drug cases).  
61 Id. at 2140; see, e.g. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 382-85 (1813). 
62 Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 66 Emory 
L.J. 1391, 1394 (2017). 
63 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 
64 18 USC § 2339B (Providing material support or resources to “foreign terrorist organizations” designated by Secretary 
of State); see United States v. Ali, 799 F.3d 1008, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting nondelegation challenge); United 
States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc);  
65 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.; United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding IEPPA prosecution against 
delegation challenge): United States v. Ali Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); see also United States v. Chi 
Tong Kuok, 671 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting nondelegation challenge in prosecution under Arms Export Control 
Act). 
66 Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Application for Arrest Warrants, United States v. Bullock, No. 20-MJ-327 
(filed E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1271741/download 
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Defense Production Act of 195067 arguably engage the domestic manifestations of the President’s 
national security powers.68 
 
The line Gorsuch would draw between criminal delegations subject to intense scrutiny and those he 
would find more within the executive’s ken is a bit hazy, as may be inevitable in such projects.69 He 
did cite United States v. Grimaud, with seeming approval.70 Did he really find the broad delegation of 
criminal authority in that case acceptable? Or was he simply nodding his respect for stare decisis, 
notwithstanding his willingness to question that principle in other contexts?71 
 
One need not, however, be sure of which administrative crimes would survive Gorsuch’s analysis to 
suspect that a great many would not, which is, presumably, his goal.  When presented, while on the 
Tenth Circuit, with a tussle on the grounds of the Denver Federal Center that led the defendant’s 
criminal prosecution for violating regulations promulgated by the General Services Administration 
and the Department of Homeland Security, Gorsuch mused (as the defendant had not raised the 
issue):  
 
Can Congress so freely delegate the core legislative business of writing criminal offenses to 
unelected property managers at GSA? Might this arrangement, though arrived at with 
Congress’s assent, still blur the line between the Legislative and Executive functions assigned 
to separate departments by our Constitution? . . . Thanks to this and many other similar and 
similarly generous congressional delegations, the Code of Federal Regulations today finds 
itself crowded with so many “crimes” that scholars actually debate their number. . . . And 
quite apart from the separation of powers questions these arrangements pose, what about 
the “reasonableness” limitation found in the specific delegation before us? In the statute at 
issue here, Congress says agency officials may prescribe only “reasonable” criminal penalties 
within the limits it has prescribed (30 days in prison, usually no more than $5,000 in fines). 
Who's to say what in that range is reasonable, and by what measure?72 
 
Gorsuch’s approach to criminal delegations would substantially end the current regime in which, in 
many policy spaces, broad delegated rulemaking authority to agencies is accompanied by statutory 
provisions making violations of certain regulations a federal crime. Relative to all federal 
prosecutions, these crimes are not often prosecuted.  But the cases that are brought, or threatened, 
are of particular significance to individuals operating within the regulatory purview and perhaps even 
more to firms, because of both the respondeat superior approach federal law takes to corporate 
criminal liability and the collateral consequence that attend corporate criminal convictions.73  
Moreover, while institutional fissures between civil and criminal enforcement authorities often 
 
67 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501 et seq. 
68 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
69 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note _. at 326 (“[T]he real question is: How much executive discretion is 
too much to count as ‘executive’?”).  
70  139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
71 See Christopher R. Green, Justice Gorsuch and Moral Reality, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 635, 663-66, 663 n.17 (2019) 
(cataloging opinions in which Justice Gorsuch has called for reconsideration of precedent, and discussing broader 
trends in his approach to stare decisis). 
72 United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Wasylyshyn, 979 F.3d 165 
(2d Cir. 2020) (upholding similar prosecution without addressing delegation issue). 
73 Richman, Stuntz & Stith, ch. 11. 
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preclude fully rationalized sorting of the egregious (criminal) from the merely bad,74 the possibility of 
a criminal referral surely affects the civil regulatory regime as well, providing coercive leverage to 
civil enforcers. 
 
Substantially curtailing the administrative crimes regime along the lines of the Gorsuch critique 
would thus be quite consequential, at least to the extent that federal prosecutors lost certain charging 
options.  Yet even more consequential, as we will see, would be the wholesale application of the 
critique’s rationale to other aspects of federal criminal law.  
 
III. Exploring Other Criminal Law Delegations 
 
Let us turn to other contexts in which entities other than Congress have long been permitted to 
define federal crimes.  To what extent are they susceptible to Gorsuch’s critique of administrative 
crimes, because they too suffer from deficiencies of democratic accountability, community 
condemnation, notice, and any separation-of-powers check? If they are to survive the adoption of 
that critique, how might they be justified? And what light might their justification shed on the terms 




Much of the analytical rigor of the Gorsuch critique comes from a proposition deeply rooted in the 
structure of the Constitution and two centuries of judicial pronouncements: Federal criminal law is 
created by Congress and Congress alone.75  Yet a closer look at the context of those 
pronouncements reveals, first, that they related only to Congress’s authority vis a vis the courts -- 
denying the existence of federal common law crimes -- and, second, that they are true only if one 
counts the broad delegation of lawmaking authority to courts to still be a species of congressional 
“creation.”76   
 
Any exploration of judicial crime definition faces a terminological challenge. Federal courts almost 
invariably speak the language of “statutory interpretation,” not lawmaking.  Equally, if one rejects 
judicial self-categorization and looks for effective delegation, some degree of the latter can always be 
found.77 Every application of even a well-tailored statute to a specific case is likely to involve 
interpretative work that can -- if one is so perversely inclined -- be called “delegation.” The 
 
74 See Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 Md. L. Rev. 985 (2018); Daniel C. 
Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill Stuntz, in The Political Heart of 
Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz 64 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012). 
75 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because 
criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should 
define criminal activity.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 U. Va. L. Rev. 965, 972 n. 17 
(2019) (collecting citations). 
76 For recognition that denial of the existence of a federal common law of crimes is largely a “myth,” see Dan M. 
Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, The Supreme Court Review, Vol. 1994, 345, 347 (1994); Dan M. 
Kahan, Is “Chevron” Relevant to Federal Criminal Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 471 (1996) (“the proposition that federal 
crimes are ‘solely creatures of statute’ is a truth so partial that it is nearly a lie”); Julie O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal 
“Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 666 (2006)); Hessick, Myth, 
supra.  
77 See Lemos, The Other Delegate, supra, at 421 (“some degree of lawmaking inheres in the task of statutory 
interpretation and application”). 
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challenge, which I hope to meet, is to highlight significant areas of federal criminal law where courts 
have exercised particular license to define crimes, and where the congressional contribution has been 
more like authorization or acquiescence than definitional -- in short, areas where judicial crime 
definition has much in common with agency rulemaking that becomes the basis of administrative 
crimes. To be sure, the fiction is generally that Congress licensed common-law type development by 
either explicitly deploying a common law term or implicitly legislating against an intended backdrop 
of dynamic common law principles.  But fiction it is, absent heroic imputations of congressional will 
or aggressive reliance on theories of ratification. Not only do such areas of judicial crime definition 
abound, but they cannot be explained as a species of asymmetrical textualism, where courts deploy 
common law principles to constrain liability but not expand it. As we will see, while constraining 
efforts may well dominate, such principles have led to expansion as well.   
 
The key case usually cited for the proposition that only Congress can create crimes and that courts 
lack the power to create common law crimes is United States v. Hudson & Goodwin.78  That case did 
not hold that courts cannot have power to create crimes, merely that such power -- if it existed -- 
could come only from Congress, which had not so delegated it.79  Still, it reflected a growing 
acceptance that crime definition was not within the judicial province.  Years before, while riding 
circuit, Justice Samuel Chase had found it as “essential” “that Congress should define the offences 
to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the 
criminal, or to pronounce a sentence on conviction.”80 Yet, some, particularly Justice Joseph Story 
(who stayed silent in Hudson), would not give up. Shortly after Hudson, Story drafted a bill that 
“would have delegated broad powers to punish conduct not expressly prohibited in federal criminal 
statutes to the federal circuit courts.”81 It did not pass, however, and by 1820, Chief Justice Marshall 
could explain that the rule of lenity is  
 
founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle 
that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is 
the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.82 
 
 
78 United States v Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 
(2010) (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Hudson for proposition that the Court had 
“long ago” “abjured” “the power to define new federal crimes”). 
79 United States v Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (“The legislative authority of the Union must 
first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense.”). 
Charles Warren thought the case reflected a misunderstanding of the drafting history of the 1789 Judiciary Act, see  
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 73 (1923), but 
others have pushed back on his conclusions.  See Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 Law & Hist. 
Rev. 267, 275 (1986). 
80 United States v. Worrell, 28 F Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798); see Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal 
Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 Law & Hist. Rev. 223, 231-32 (1986) 
(citing Worrell as example of one line of judicial thinking at the time). 
81 Gary D. Rowe. The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the 
Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale L. J. 919, 926 n.44 (1992); see also Preyer, supra note __, at 258-
59. 
82 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); see also United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 
(1818) (Marshall, C.J.); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (Congress could not “delegate to the 
Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative”); Richman, Stith & Stuntz, at 82-
83. 
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As Dan Kahan has noted, however, the rule of lenity, as a guarantee of legislative supremacy in the 
criminal law arena, has always been in competition with the Court’s quiet embrace of a delegated 
judicial lawmaking authority that only extreme disingenuity can call statutory interpretation.83  As 
Kahan relates, the Court’s key initial move was to use Congress’s deployment of a common law term 
as an implicit invitation for courts to exercise their common-lawmaking powers.84 In 1826, in United 
States v. Kelly, presented with the claim that Congress, in the 1790 Crimes Act, had failed sufficiently 
to define the offense of “endeavoring to make a revolt” aboard ship, Justice Bushrod Washington -- 
who Kahan persuasively suggests was channeling Justice Story85 -- wrote: “although the act of 
Congress does not define this offence, it is, nevertheless, competent to the Court to give a judicial 
definition of it.”86 
 
Kelly began a line of cases that continues to this day.  Where a federal criminal statute includes a 
common law term like “fraud,” the Court will have no compunction tapping into robust lines of 
common law authority  -- drawing on tradition but adding its own elaborations.  Vagueness issues 
will be dismissed, if they even come up, as the Court will find the broad statutory language clear 
enough. To be sure, the Court will speak the language of interpretation.  Thus in Neder v. United 
States, when finding that the government needed to show “materiality,” notwithstanding the absence 
of that element from several fraud statutes, the Court invoked the “well-established rule of 
construction that ‘’[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ... the 
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’”87  Finding no effort by Congress to preclude 
the imposition of this element, the Court did so.88 Justice Scalia’s analysis of why the “extortion” 
charged in United States v. Sekhar89 was not “extortion” under the Hobbs Act began in similar terms, 
quoting Felix Frankfurter: “‘if a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether 
the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.’”90 
 
This is not to say that the Court will invariably reach for common law as a constraining principle.  In 
Durland v. United States,91 the Court brushed aside the defendant’s (correct) claim that common law 
 
83  Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S. Ct. Rev. 345, 367 (“[L]enity is in competition with 
-- indeed, has been largely eclipsed by -- another basic principle of federal criminal jurisprudence, a principle that has 
never been formally acknowledged but that is as old as lenity itself[:] . . . that Congress may delegate, and courts 
legitimately exercise, criminal lawmaking authority”). For an exploration of “federal courts’ hesitancy to strike down 
criminal statutes as violating legality-related doctrines or the frequency with which the courts expansively interpret 
statutory language,” see Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1521 (2008). 
84 Kahan at 372-73 (“Kelly supplied what was, in effect, a blueprint for the hidden rule of delegated lawmaking in federal 
criminal law.”). 
85 Id. at 373 n.127. 
86 United States v. Kelly, 4 US (11 Wheat) 417 (1826). 
87 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 322 (1992)). But see United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490-99 (1997) (declining to read a “materiality” 
element into a false statement statute that lacked any such reference even though many false statement statutes have 
explicit “materiality” requirements).  
88 Id. at 25. 
89 570 U.S. 729 (2013). 
90 570 at 733 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 
(1947)). 
91 161 U.S. 306 (1896). 
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understanding precluded using the mail fraud statute against a defendant who misled investors only 
about future performance: 
 
[B]eyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought to be remedied, 
which is always significant in determining the meaning. It is common knowledge 
that nothing is more alluring than the expectation of receiving large 
returns on small investments. . . .  
In the light of this the statute must be read, and, so read, it includes 
everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, 
or suggestions and promises as to the future. The significant fact is the intent 
and purpose. . . .92 
 
Congress’s response to Durland was to codify it in 1909.93 Since then, the Court has embraced the 
protean flexibility of the federal fraud statutes, at least with respect to non-governmental property 
deprivations.94 Similarly, the Court has paid little heed to Justice Thomas’ recurring point that the 
Court’s interpretation of “extortion” “under color of law” in the Hobbs Act to encompass bribery 
of public officials amounts to a judicially created crime -- quite different from common law 
understandings of extortion by a public officer, which required pretense of official entitlement.95 
 
Justice Stevens was the rare justice to explicitly speak in delegation terms.  Dissenting from the 
Court’s 1987 rejection, in McNally v. United States, of the “right to honest services” as a cognizable 
deprivation under the mail fraud statute, Stevens noted: 
 
Statutes like the Sherman Act, the civil rights legislation, and the mail fraud statute were 
written in broad general language on the understanding that the courts would have wide 
latitude in construing them to achieve the remedial purposes that Congress had identified. 
The wide open spaces in statutes such as these are most appropriately interpreted as implicit 
delegations of authority to the courts to fill in the gaps in the common-law tradition of case-
by-case adjudication. The notion that the meaning of the words “any scheme or artifice to 




92 Id. at 313; see Richman, Stith & Stuntz, at 85 (“It is hard to square Durland and Neder. The bottom line seems to be 
that common-law definitions are sometimes controlling, and sometimes not.”). 
93 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357 (1987) 
94 See United States v. Maze 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“When a ‘new’ fraud develops -- as 
constantly happens -- the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new 
phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.”); Samuel W. 
Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971 (2006); see also Richman, Stith & Stuntz, supra note __, ch. 4 (on 
sweep of fraud liability for property deprivations). 
95See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 278 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 
1437 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Kate Stith, No Entrenchment: Thomas on the Hobbs Act, the Ocasio Mess, 
and the Vagueness Doctrine, 127 Yale L.J.F. 233(2017); Charles F. C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A 
Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 Geo. L.J. 1171 (1977). 
96 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Kozminski; Kahan, Common 
Law, supra _ at 375.   
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It is worth noting that the Court’s rationale in McNally was substantially driven by federalism 
concerns.  The Court distinguished,97 and continues to accept, an extraordinarily broad reading of 
“fraud” against the federal government,98 one that pushes beyond its traditional common law 
definition to a capacious and bespoke one, lacking clear foundation in “plain meaning, legislative 
history, or interpretive canons” and reaching “‘‘any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, 
obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.’”99 
 
Perhaps we can see the Court’s embrace of something more than interstitial common lawmaking 
authority as a species of Volokh’s “inherent powers corollary” for assessing delegations.100 Even a 
firm adherent to legislative supremacy might see the legitimacy of considerable judicial crime 
definition where Congress has explicitly spoken in common law terms and implicitly invoked the 
expertise and traditions of courts.  Perhaps the “inherent” common law making authority that the 
Court denied itself in Hudson and Goodwin springs back with the explicit blessing of Congress?  Yet 
judicial crime definition does not stop there. 
 
Moving onward on the continuum between ostensible exercises in statutory interpretation -- as one 
may characterize cases that use common law terms as points of analytical departure -- to wholesale 
judicial crime definition, we come to a middle ground: federal criminal lawmaking by courts when 
statutes are utterly silent, or when statutory language is largely unheeded.   
 
Defenses are one area over which the Court has taken virtual ownership.  Perhaps this is not strictly 
an area of substantive criminal lawmaking, as it does not involve offense definition. Yet if the 
former term is understood to cover law that sets the terms of who can be convicted, it certainly 
covers defenses. In United States v. Bailey,101 even though the statute criminalizing escape from federal 
custody failed to mention any such defense, the Court, after a brief nod to legislative supremacy, 
reasoned that “because Congress . . . legislates against a background of Anglo-Saxon common law” 
when it enacts federal criminal statutes, “a defense of duress or coercion may well have been 
contemplated by Congress when it enacted” the escape offense.102 Concern that defense recognition 
can undermine a statutory scheme underlay the Court’s hostility to the necessity defense in United 
States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.103 But by 2006, in Dixon v. United States,104 the Court 
unanimously took on a broad defense definition role -- to the extent that one takes the 
operationalization of a defense as part of its definition -- with methodology being the only issue. 
 
Reading Dixon is like walking into an ALI Restatement drafting meeting. That there was a federal 
duress defense was uncontested, with the Court citing Bailey but disclaiming any need right now to 
nail down its elements.105  The Court needed only to determine who bore the burden and by what 
 
97 McNally, 483 U.S. at 358 n. 8 (distinguishing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)). 
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (criminalizing conspiracies to, among other things, “defraud the United States, or any agency 
thereof in any manner or for any purpose”). 
99 United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 885, 861 (1966)). 
100 See supra note __ and accompanying text.  
101 444 US 394 (1980). 
102 Id. at 414 n.11. 
103 532 US 483, 489-95, 490 n.3 (2001). 
104 548 US 1 (2006). 
105 Id. at 4 n.2. 
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standard of proof.  Because federal crimes are “solely creatures of statute,”106 Justice Stevens, writing 
for the Court, felt bound to decide how Congress “may have contemplated” the duress defense 
when, in 1968, it enacted the particular offenses in the case. But in the absence of “evidence in the 
[Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets] Act’s structure or history that Congress actually 
considered the question of how the duress defense should work,”107 the Court would simply look to 
“the long-established common-law rule.”108 
 
Concurring Justice Kennedy noted: “While the Court looks to the state of the law at the time the 
statute was enacted, . . . the better reading of the Court’s opinion is that isolated authorities or 
writings do not control unless they were indicative of guiding principles upon which Congress likely 
would have relied. Otherwise, it seems altogether a fiction to attribute to Congress any intent one 
way or the other in assigning the burden of proof.”109  Put differently: Congress had left defense 
definition to the Court, and it was free to draw on a range of respectable sources like the Model 
Penal Code and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws to set a consistent 
rule for all criminal statutes. 
 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in Stevens’ opinion “with the understanding that it 
does not hold that the allocation of the burden of persuasion on the defense of duress may vary 
from one federal criminal statute to another” (thus denying precisely what Stevens said).110 For Alito, 
however, the contours of this transsubstantive defense would come from the common law in 1789.  
Congress started passing criminal statutes against a common law backdrop, and since it had never 
addressed the defense but simply kept passing new criminal laws, Alito would presume that the 1789 
version remained operative. 
 
Justice Breyer, joined by Souter, dissented. Like every member of the Court except for Stevens, he 
thought defenses should look the same across all statutes.  But Breyer -- second only to Stevens in 
embracing the notion that the Court exercises delegated power to refashion criminal statutes -- read 
congressional silence to mean “that Congress expected the courts to develop burden rules governing 
affirmative defenses as they have done in the past, by beginning with the common law and taking 
full account of the subsequent need for that law to evolve through judicial practice informed by 
reason and experience.”111 
 
As Caleb Nelson has observed, “the lower federal courts do not use the rhetoric of statutory 
interpretation quite so consistently,” and one regularly sees references to "common-law defenses" 
and "federal common law."112 But the Supreme Court largely makes a pretense of engaging in 
statutory interpretation, even though in entrapment cases, one needs to follow the citations back to 
 
106 Id. at 12 (citing United States v. Liporata, 471 U.S. at 424). 
107 Id at 13. 
108 Id. at 14. Justice Stevens took comfort in the fact that “when a congressional committee did consider codifying the 
duress defense, it would have had the courts determine the defense ‘according to the principles of the common law as 
they may be interpreted in the light of reason and experience.’ S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 501 (1978).” Id at 14.  n.8. 
109 Id. at 18 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
110 Id. at 19 (Alito, J., concurring). 
111 Id. at 22 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
112 Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
657, 757 & n. 439 (2013) (citing cases); see also Richman, Stith & Stuntz at 112-18; United States v. Waldman, 835 F.3d 
751 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting contours of self-defense defense in prison context). 
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Sorrells for a reminder that the extensive judicial crafting of this defense finds its ostensible roots in a 
legislative enactment.113  The key move was in Sorrells -- where a Prohibition agent had badgered the 
defendant into selling him some whiskey.  Here the Court simply reached for the absurdity doctrine 
and found itself  
 
unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress, in enacting this statute, that its 
processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government 
officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its 
commission and to punish them.114 
 
Lest one think that the Court’s exercises a broad licence to tailor criminal liability only to constrain 
it, one need look no further than the Pinkerton115 doctrine -- “a judicially-created rule that makes a 
conspirator criminally liable for the substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when they 
are reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.”116  Conspiracy liability 
is a statutory creation -- drawing on a long Anglo-American statutory tradition 117-- but nothing in 
conspiracy statutes -- which after all, often set lesser punishments than the substantive offense a 
defendant is alleged to have conspired to commit -- makes a defendant automatically liable for the 
foreseeable substantive crimes of his co-conspirators.118  That was a purely judicial construct -- albeit 
one anchored in common law agency principles --  and a massively consequential one at that.119 
Congress has explicitly allowed for corporate criminal liability in certain statutes - including the one 
charged in the landmark 1909 New York Central case.120 Yet that principle had already been 
established long before by prosecutors and courts “applying general criminal laws — laws that, by 
 
113 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
114 287 U.S. at 448; see Jessica A. Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 979 (2014) (exploring the 
consequences of the treatment of entrapment as substantive law question rather than a procedural protection). 
115 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645–48 (1946). 
116 United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002); see Michael Manning, Comment, A Common Law Crime 
Analysis of Pinkerton v. United States: Sixty Years of Impermissible Judicially-Created Criminal Liability, 67 Mont. L. 
Rev. 89 (2006); Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading's Legality Problem (March 16, 2018). 127 Yale L.J. F. at 129, 135 (June 
2017) (citing Pinkerton and willful blindness as example of “judge-developed doctrines that curtail or extend criminal 
liability”). 
117 See Mark L. Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 Am. J. 
Crim. L. 91, 95 n.14 (2006); Francis Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv L. Rev. 393, 394-409 (1922); Note; 
Developments In the Law, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 922, 923 (1959). 
118 See Alex Kreit, Vicarious Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of the Pinkerton Doctrine, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 
585, 595 (2008) (noting that “[a]s a matter of statutory interpretation,” Pinkerton dissent’s “reasoning appears to be far 
more persuasive than the majority’s,” and that “the majority did not identify any statutory basis at all for holding 
defendants liable for the substantive crimes of their co-conspirators in the absence of proof of aiding and abetting”). 
119 See Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
147, 147-48 (2008) (noting sweep of Pinkerton liability). 
120 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-92, 495 (1909) (upholding the corporate-
criminal-liability provisions of the Elkins Act); Edward B. Diskant, Note, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 Yale L.J. 126, 138 
(2008)(noting “both before and after New York Central, Congress enacted thousands of statutes creating new or 
additional criminal liability for corporations”). 
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their terms, did not extend to corporations as entities — to corporate conduct.”121 And it thereafter 
spread across all offenses, even without clear statutory authorization.122 
 
Another purely judicial construct, perhaps even more consequential, has been the establishment of 
“willful blindness” as satisfying the requirement of “knowledge” across federal statutes.123 This 
largely was the handiwork of the lower courts,124 with the Supreme Court deigning to acknowledge it 
only recently, in the context of a civil patent infringement case.125  Even when complicity liability has 
a clear statutory basis, as it the case for aiding and abetting,126 the Court continues to treat broad 
issues of criminal responsibility as another of its special provinces,127 perhaps as an extension of yet 
another area in which the Court has assumed considerable ownership -- mens rea. 
 
When recognizing and defining defenses, the Supreme Court at least has the “benefit” of absolute 
legislative silence.128  When setting mens rea standards, however, it must reckon with variegated 
statutory language.  Yet the latter has not particularly inhibited the Court from taking the laboring 
oar in defining the statute-specific contours of this critical element. 
 
 Teaching the Court’s mens rea cases is a joy for those who love pushing students hard.  Relatively 
stable principles do emerge from those cases, but they often have little to do with the statutory 
definition (if there is one) of the requisite mens mea, and much to do with the Court’s larger project 
of protecting the “morally blameless” from punishment.129  In a cogent distillation of the cases, 
Stephen Smith explains:  
 
 
121 Id. at 136; see also Richman, Stith, Stuntz, at 806-07. 
122 Diskant, supra at __, at 136-37. 
123 Under the willful blindness doctrine, the prosecution may satisfy a mens rea of knowledge by proving that the 
defendant consciously chose “to avoid learning the truth.” United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-04 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(en banc); see Richman, Stith & Stuntz, supra at 510-11; Gregory M. Gilchrist, Willful Blindness as Mere Evidence, 54 
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 17), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3690351. 
124 See Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 Yale L.J. 2231, 2233-34 
(1993). 
125 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011) (“[t]he doctrine of willful blindness is well 
established in criminal law”); see United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that Global-Tech 
“simply describes existing case law”);  cf. Spurr v. United States, 174 U. S. 728, 738 (1899) (using similar concept). 
126 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
127 See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1246-47 (2014) (refining actus reus and mens rea requirements in 
aiding and abetting case); Kit Kinports, Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 
133 (2015). 
128 The exception is the insanity defense, which Congress redefined after the acquittal of John Hinckley, Jr. See 18 U.S. 
Code § 17; Jodie English, The Light between Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity 
Defense, 40 Hastings L.J. 1, 1 (1988) (noting that Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 was “first time in history” that 
Congress “passed comprehensive legislation pertaining to the defense of criminal responsibility”). 
129 Stephen F. Smith, “Innocence” and the Guilty Mind, 69 Hastings L.J. 1609, 1653  (2018) (“the project of limiting the 
reach of criminal statutes in accordance with moral blameworthiness takes a back seat to inferences of presumed 
legislative intent”); see also Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 
75 L. & Contemp. Probs. 109, 126 (2012); John S. Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in 
Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1057-1130 (1999); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries 
and Federal Regulatory Crimes, 59 Hastings L.J. 137 (2007); Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 Harv. L. 
Rev. 828 (1999). 
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The first step of the mens rea analysis, at which the Court seeks to identify the potential for 
morally undeserved punishment, operates outside of the literal definition of the crime. The 
Court decides whether conduct encompassed within the literal terms of a criminal law might 
nonetheless be regarded as “innocent” or “blameless.” Quite inconsistently, however, the 
important second stage, devoted to fashioning the heightened standards of mental culpability 
necessary to guarantee blameworthiness, operates within the definition of the offense. That 
is to say, the Court looks to the wording of the statute for clues about whether or not 
Congress would have accepted additional, more demanding mens rea requirements.130 
 
Since the Court has generally resisted constitutionalizing substantive criminal law131 and it can hardly 
declare mens rea -- a foundational element of every offense -- as a common law space, its moves 
must sound in statutory interpretation.  Yet as Smith notes, “[t]o the extent the Court . . .  remains in 
the business of enforcing judicially created mens rea requirements, it must be because the Court is 
not fully committed to the textualist faithful-agent model in this context.”132  Its approach instead is 
what Smith calls the “cooperative/partnership model,” which entails an 
 
institutional division of labor between Congress and the courts in criminal cases. Congress 
focuses primarily on defining the prohibited act and grading the offense. The definition of 
the mental element of federal crimes, however, is left principally to the courts. Naturally, 
when Congress has selected a particular mens rea option, the choice is binding upon the 
courts. Courts are otherwise impliedly delegated the power to flesh out the mental elements 
of the crime in light of background principles of the criminal law, including the notion that 
“an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention.”133 
 
Judicially Crafted Elements 
 
Moving along the continuum of judicial lawmaking engagement, we have seen the statutory use of 
common law words taken as an invitation to provide content to open-textured terms, and the heavy 
use of statutory silence (defenses) or perceived underspecification (mens rea) to justify 
transsubstantive judicial projects.  What we haven’t yet seen is judicial crime definition akin to the   
explicit and self-conscious criminal lawmaking we saw agencies do when exercising delegated 
powers. Yet, one can find examples of just those sorts of common law criminal projects (within the 
context of a sweeping congressional delegation). 
 
The most dramatic example of criminal common lawmaking comes in the area of civil rights crimes. 
Since 1968, Congress has taken some pains to define civil rights offenses, particularly with respect to 
private conduct, with The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
2009 a conspicuous example.134 But two stalwarts of federal criminal civil rights enforcement remain: 
 
130 Smith, supra note __ at 1653. 
131 See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 1, 6-7 (1996) 
(arguing for the development of substantive constitutional criminal law); Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, 
and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1333 (1998) (noting that “the tale of the unfulfilled promise of 
substantive constitutional criminal law.” while largely true “ is incomplete and misleading so long as it omits the process 
account of the Constitution and criminal law”). 
132 Smith supra _ at 1657. 
133 Id. at 1657-58 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 2476, 250 (1952)). 
134 18 USC § 249; see also 18 USC § 245.  
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18 USC § 241, which traces its lineage back to the Enforcement Act of 1870, and 18 USC § 242, 
whose origins are in the Civil Right Act of 1866.135 Once its commitment to Reconstruction 
crumbled in the 1870s, the Justice Department stopped enforcing these statutes until the mid 1930s, 
and to this day, the Department has exercised considerable control on their deployment.136  
 
Yet once charged, these statutes have an extraordinarily sweep. Section 241 broadly targets 
conspiracies “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free exercise or 
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, 
or because of his having so exercised the same.”  Section 242 has an explicit state action component 
and targets any who “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully 
subjects any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.137  Put differently, these crimes are 
defined by constitutional common law.138  
 
Concern about the sweep and vagueness of these offenses -- as well as the free hand the Court has 
long exercised in setting mens rea terms -- led the Court in Screws v. United States (1945) -- its first 
criminal civil rights case since the demise of Reconstruction -- to impose a “willfulness” standard for 
both statutes that requires the Government to show that the defendant acted with a specific intent 
to interfere with the federal right in question.139  To be sure, figuring out what this standard means 
has not always been easy for the lower courts, but the need for some heightened inquiry is well 
established.140 
 
Yet even as these mens rea interventions sought to address notice concerns, there remained a 
legislative specificity problem: how to define the actus reas of these offenses.  In particular, what are 
the “rights” that §§ 241 and 242 protect against deprivation, and who would decide this question.  
Apparently, the scope of protections would be defined solely through judicial dynamic incorporation 
of constitutional common law, with (possibly) no legislative contribution save the invocation of the 
Constitution in those statutes.  It was just this problem, as well as notice concerns, that troubled the 
Sixth Circuit when the Government charged a Tennessee judge with sexually assaulting a number of 
women who had the misfortune to have business before him, thereby depriving them of “rights and 
privileges which are secured and protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, 
namely the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, including the right to be 
free from willful sexual assault.”141  Writing for an en banc majority, Judge Merritt spoke the 
 
135 Richman, Stith & Stuntz, at 430; see Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of 
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2113, 2138 (1993). 
136 Richman, Stith & Stuntz, 432-44; see Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal 
Courts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876 (1985); Robert K. Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights: 
Quest for a Sword 29 (1947); Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the Department of 
Justice (1997). 
137 §§ 241 & 242 
138 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457 (2001); David A. 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996). 
139 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (§ 242); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 223 (1974) (“[S]ince the 
gravamen of the offense under § 241 is conspiracy, the prosecution must show that the offender acted with a specific 
intent to interfere with the federal rights in question”). 
140 Richman, Stith & Stuntz at 442-43.  
141 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997). 
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language of statutory interpretation: In passing and codifying § 242, Congress hardly evinced “a 
deliberate intent to create an evolving criminal law which expands to include new constitutional 
rights as they become a part of our civil constitutional law.”142 But, he complained,  the Supreme 
Court had regrettably been undeterred:  “Screws is the only Supreme Court case in our legal history in 
which a majority of the Court seems willing to create a common law crime.”143 Lacking the ability to 
overturn this troubling artifact, the Sixth Circuit would substantially limit its scope to situations in 
which the Supreme Court had announced the right in question on fundamentally similar facts.  
Because “the right not to be assaulted” was not “understood” as a “constitutional right,” and was 
not “declared as such by the Supreme Court,” “listed in the Constitution, nor is it a well-established 
right of procedural due process,”144 its deprivation could not form the basis for criminal liability. 
 
When the Supreme Court took the case and reversed, it showed none of the Sixth Circuit’s qualms 
with this judicially defined offense. Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court in United States v. 
Lanier, recognized “the irony that a prosecution to enforce one application of its spacious protection 
of liberty can threaten the accused with deprivation of another.”145  But rather than engage with the 
Sixth Circuit’s separation-of-powers challenge, he focused on the fair warning concerns that had also 
troubled the Sixth Circuit and found them amply answered without any methodological restrictions 
on how a right had been made sufficiently specific.  He noted: 
 
Although the Sixth Circuit was concerned, and rightly so, that disparate decisions in various 
Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point widely considered, such a 
circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough, 
without any need for a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other 
courts are inadequate as a matter of law to provide it.146 
 
In a footnote, and only there, Souter addressed Judge Merritt’s scurrilous allegation: “Screws did not 
‘create a common law crime’; it narrowly construed a broadly worded Act of Congress, and the 
policies favoring strict construction of criminal statutes oblige us to carry out congressional intent as 
far as the Constitution will admit.”  Moreover, any suggestion that “Congress never intended § 242 
to extend to ‘newly-created constitutional rights,’ is belied by the fact that Congress has increased 
the penalties for the section's violation several times since Screws was decided, without contracting its 
substantive scope.”147 
 
As a practical matter, § 242 liability is quite limited. The Justice Department brings a relatively small 
number of cases -- at least relative to what are likely the far more numerous instances of malicious 
or reckless violence or other rights-violating misconduct by officials at all levels of government.148 
 
142 United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d 520 U.S. 259. 
143 Id. at 1391. 
144 Id. at 1392 
145 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265.  
146 Id. at 269; see Trevor Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 
74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 455, 469 (2001) (the fair warning requirement described in Lanier “bars courts from applying a novel 
construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to 
be within its scope.” (quoting 520 U.S. at 266)). 
147 Id. at 267 n.6 (quoting Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1387) 
148 TRAC Reports, Police Officers Rarely Charged for Excessive Use of Force in Federal Court (June 17, 2020), 
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/615/#:~:text=Number%20of%20Prosecutions%20Under%20%C2%A7,cases%2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3803618
3/2020 draft – final version forthcoming in 39 Yale Journal on Regulation, Issue 1, 2021 
 
21 
And lower courts have proceeded gingerly, as when the Third Circuit rejected the Government’s 
effort to charge the Bridgegate defendants with violating New Jersey residents “right to localized 
travel on public roadways free from restrictions unrelated to legitimate government objectives.”149  
Still, every aspect of the offense is an artifact of judicial decision making, subject only to a 
congressional delegation that encompasses the entire scope of rights established through ongoing 
judicial interpretations of the Constitution and attaches penalties to deprivations.  Here, as Tom 
Merrill put it, the Court has interpreted “the text to mean that the enacting body specifically 
intended that the relevant legal norms in a specific area are to be developed by the federal courts in 
accordance with the incremental decisionmaking process of the common law.”150 
 
The Court can sometimes seem to be in almost comic denial of its civil rights crime-definition role.  
Thus, in United States v. Kozminski,151 where defendants were charged under § 241 and another more 
specific statute with conspiring to interfere with an individual’s Thirteenth Amendment right to be 
free from “involuntary servitude,” the Court rejected a prosecution theory of “involuntariness” that 
went beyond “the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.”  Invoking the rule of lenity, it 
noted that the  
Government's interpretation would delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently 
legislative task of determining what type of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible 
that they should be punished as crimes. It would also subject individuals to the risk of 
arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction.152 
 
But, of course, for guidance in the “inherently legislative task” of defining Thirteenth Amendment 
“coercion,” the Court simply cited its own constitutional precedents.153  
 
When casting about for areas in which Congress has delegated criminal lawmaking authority to the 
courts, Justice Stevens would regularly cite Antitrust.154  Indeed, in this area the Court has largely 
dropped the pretence of statutory interpretation, making Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in Tom 
Merrill’s words, a paradigm of implied delegated lawmaking.155 And violations of the Sherman Act 
can be and are regularly prosecuted as crimes.  Indeed, during the Act’s early years, prosecutors 
brought criminal cases charging a broad variety of anticompetitive and monopolistic behaviors.156  
But the offense was originally a misdemeanor, and as Daniel Sokol notes: “More than a generation 
 
0in%20the%20United%20States.&text=Thus%2C%20these%20cases%20represent%20just,100%2C000%20prosec
utions%20or%200.027%20percent (reporting only forty-nine § 242 prosecutions in fiscal year 2019 and that 
historically the DOJ has declined close to ninety percent of § 242 referrals). 
149 United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 585 (3d Cir. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 140 S.Ct. 1565 (2020). 
150 Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 40 (1985). 
151 487 U.S. 931 (1988). 
152 Id. at 949. 
153 Id. at 943. 
154 See Kozminski, 487 US at 965-66 (Stevens concurring in judgment); McNally, 483 US at 372-73 (Stevens dissenting); 
Dan Kahan, Rule of Lenity, supra at 395 n.254. 
155 Merrill, Common Law Powers, at 45; see Nat’l Soc’y of Professional Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 
(1978) (scope of Sherman Act sec. 1 determined by a process of giving “shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing 
on common-law tradition.”); see also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antitexualism, __ Notre Dame L. Rev. ___ (2021); see 
also Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 263, 
267, 267–68 n.9 (1986) (noting separation-of-powers concerns with judicial lawmaking under the Sherman Act). 
156 Gregory J. Werden, Individual Accountability Under the Sherman Act: The Early Years, 31 Antitrust 100, 100 
(2017). 
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has passed since there have been any criminal indictments, let alone jail time, for § 1 and § 2 
noncollusion cases. The DOJ has brought a single criminal noncollusion antitrust case since the 
introduction of the felony penalties.”157 What might seem as a massive space for common law 
criminal development has thus, by dint of prosecutorial and judicial restraint, been compressed to a 
series of discrete and well-defined offenses.   
 
Virtually all criminal cases have been limited to per se illegal instances of horizontal collusion -- like 
price-fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation -- involving little or doctrinal development.158 Some 
combination of executive and judicial restraint has thus constrained the ostensible sweep of the 
Court’s criminal lawmaking authority in the antitrust area. The Department’s Antitrust Manual states 
that “current [] policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and prosecution in cases involving 
horizontal, per se unlawful agreements[.]”159 And in recent litigation, the Government noted that it 
had “long eschewed prosecuting conduct subject to the rule of reason, and it has no interest in 
doing so here.”160 Sokol goes on to suggest that any effort to proceed criminally beyond per se illegal 
conduct might well render the Sherman Act void for vagueness.161  
 
For an example of a purely statutory space -- with no common law or constitutional roots -- that 
Congress has left for courts to fill in, one need only consider the RICO statute. It criminalizes little 
conduct that was not already covered by a federal or state penal law, nor does it necessarily increase 
a defendant’s sentencing exposure.  But it massively increases the ability of federal prosecutors to 
pull together a sprawling set of offenses and defendants, gaining proof synergies (known to 
defendants as “spillover prejudice”) that incentivize the investment of investigative resources and 
extend the scope and likelihood of conviction.  Access to this powerful charging tool requires -- 
over and above proof of predicate federal or state crimes -- proof of elements like “enterprise,” 
“pattern,” and “association,” that, with scant assistance from Congress, courts have made their 
peculiar province.162 
 
Judicial delegation in context 
 
The Sherman Act and the Reconstruction civil rights criminal statutes thus offer dramatic instances 
of both maximal legislative delegation and considerable doctrinal self-restraint by prosecutors and 
courts. A pragmatist might sit back and posit some natural equilibrium of criminal lawmaking across 
all three branches, in the shadow of constitutional notice and vagueness concerns. Still, broad 
 
157 D. Daniel Sokol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1545, 1557 (2019). 
158 So hardened has the adjudicative presentation of per se cases become that defendants recently challenged the judicial 
framing as a violation of their right to have the jury decide all the elements of the crime. See United States v. Sanchez, 
760 Fed. App’x 533 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied., 140 S. Ct. 909 (2020). 
159 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Manual, at III-12 (5th Ed. 2018).  
160 United States v. Kemp, 907 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2018). 
161 Sokol at 1594 (“Without a clear and objective standard for what criminal enforcement would look like for 
noncollusion cases under the Sherman Act, antitrust may have a void for vagueness problem.”). Recently, the 
Government argued that it was free to bring criminal charges involving anticompetitive conduct not per se illegal, but 
the issue was ultimately mooted. See United States v. Kemp, 907 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2018), on remand, 2019 WL 
763796 (D. Utah 2019). 
162 Richman, Stith & Stuntz, at 576-608; see Kahan, Chevron at 473 (RICO “best conceptualized” “as an implicit 
delegation of authority to courts to fashion their own rules.”). 
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acceptance of this state of affairs should pose a considerable challenge to a formalist attracted by the 
Gorsuch critique. 
 
How do these crime definition delegations to courts -- particularly maximal ones like §§ 241 and 242 
-- fare when judged against the challenged delegations to administrative agencies?  As Margaret 
Lemos has noted: “virtually no effort has been made to fit delegations to courts into nondelegation 
theory or practice.”163 The “intelligible” principle for these civil rights statutes is the U.S 
Constitution, as interpreted by courts over time.  As a big fan of the Constitution, I find it quite 
intelligible, and one can invoke the case inventing that principle and find considerable flexibility in it.  
Back in 1928, the Court noted that when “determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance 
from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to 
common sense and the inherent necessities of the government coordination."164  Yet it’s hard to see 
how such a massive delegation is consistent with the standards Justice Gorsuch would demand for 
crime definition. As Lemos notes “[t]he focus of the intelligible principle requirement is not on the 
characteristics of Congress's chosen delegate, but on Congress itself and the choices it must make.165 
Perhaps justification can be found in the analysis -- which Gorsuch found applicable to certain 
delegations to the Executive -- that excuses sweeping delegations that overlap with the delegatee 
branch’s inherent powers. After all, the courts are the final arbiters of the Constitution.166 But that’s 
an idiosyncratic and limited analysis. 
 
Measured against the criteria usually used by those normatively assessing delegations to agencies, the 
delegations to courts explored here -- at least those at the maximal end of the continuum -- fare 
poorly.  Perhaps courts -- at least federal ones with life tenure judges -- should be excused from 
standard delegation scrutiny because their insulation from the political process means that they 
“pose a lesser danger to liberty than do agencies.”167   Yet other features of maximal judicial 
delegations push hard in the opposite direction -- since the accountability that Gorsuch seeks is the 
antithesis of insulation.   Courts are not subject to controls that Congress can place on agencies168 or 
the political accountability that agencies have through the President.169  
 
Perhaps the very nature of courts, with their adherence to precedent-based reasoning and 
incremental change, makes their accountability of less concern than that of agencies, where policy-
 
163 Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 405, 408 (2008). 
164W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 276 U. S. 406 (1928); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (noting “this Court has deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the 
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority’” (quoting American 
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 329 U. S. 105 (1946)). 
165 Lemos, supra at 436. 
166 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”). 
167 See Volokh 66 Emory at 1414 
168 Whatever agenda control Congress has over courts has rarely been exercised in practice. Richard Fallon, Jurisdiction-
Stripping Reconsidered, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1043, 1045 (2010). But Congress can, and particularly in the criminal area, has 
legislatively nullified statutory rulings. See infra note (172)and accompanying text.  
169 Lemos, at 449; Volokh 66 Emory at 1414; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 93–94 (1985).   
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driven decisionmaking can lead to dramatic legal discontinuities demanding close scrutiny.170  Yet 
one can flip that point and draw on the literature on the political accountability of agencies, which would 
valorize (or condemn) these discontinuities as reflecting the increasing domination of the 
bureaucracy by a politically responsive (albeit inexpert) Executive.171 Because they proceed 
categorically, and not case by case, agencies can also more easily be accountable for changing the 
legal landscape. 
 
Yet maybe judicial law development derives accountability from its institutional setting.  For it 
cannot occur without prosecutors presenting factual narratives and crafting legal liability theories.172   
How does the conditional nature of judicial crime definition cut with respect to the Gorsuch 
critique?  Prosecutorial gatekeeping ensures some separation of power and brings a degree of 
political accountability.  To be sure, direct prosecutorial accountability is somewhat limited because, 
as Hessick notes, federal prosecutorial decisions are usually made below the level of a political 
appointee.173  But even mine-run decisions come with a degree of networked accountability that I 
have described elsewhere.174 More importantly, prosecutors must take at least co-ownership of any 
judicial expansions of criminal liability, an ownership that comes with at least potential 
accountability to Congress. One need only look at the exceptional centralized control that the Justice 
Department has exercised over criminal civil rights and antitrust prosecutions -- two spheres of 
ostensible common law development that also potentially target groups with considerable political 
power -- to see this political accountability at work.  Conversely, when judicial legal development 
curtails criminal liability, the Executive will regularly turn to Congress for a legislative fix.175  
 
Of course, the democratic accountability that prosecutorial gatekeeping and prosecutorial mediated 
Congressional oversight bring to the judicial crime definition project comes with the risk of self-
dealing that is a different concern of Gorsuch. Dan Kahan has cogently suggested that the 
prosecutorial “power of initiative” comes with its own pathology.176  For prosecutors not only 
anchor judicial lawmaking to a larger political environment but pursue their own agendas.  By 
 
170 Justice Gorsuch recently complained that “these days it sometimes seems agencies change their statutory 
interpretations almost as often as elections change administrations.” Guedes v. BATF, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (mem.) 
(statement in respect to cert. denial). 
171 See Peter L. Strauss, The Trump Administration and the Rule of Law, 170 Française d’Administration Publique 433, 
433–46 (2019); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2272-2363 (2001) (offering some 
normative critiques and defenses of presidential accountability and control); see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 818–24 (2013). 
172 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 758 
(2003) (discussing prosecutors’ gatekeeping role). 
173 Hessick, Common Law Crimes, at 1003. 
174 Daniel Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, in Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-National Study 40, 68 (M. 
Langer & D. Sklansky eds., 2017). 
175 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331 (1991); 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)(1)(B), 123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9)) (overriding United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008)); Riegle Community Development and 
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411(c)(1), 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C. § 5324(c)) (overriding Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)); An Act to Prevent the Manufacturing, 
Distribution, and Use of Illegal Drugs, and for Other Purposes, § 7603, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346) (overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)). 
176 See Dan Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law, 479-80; See Samuel Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1514 (2008) (“Broader liability rules afford prosecutors more freedom to apply them to novel 
contexts, generating more cases that require courts to decide whether to interpret liability rules broadly, and so on.”). 
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controlling what courts learn about an enforcement environment, picking cases whose facts counsel 
liability expansion in sometimes troubling directions, and pleading out cases that would lead to 
adverse decisions, prosecutors have an influence on judicial law development that is likely greater 
and is certainly less transparent than the influence they have over agency rule-promulgation, 
particularly when the agency is not the Justice Department.177 
 
Indeed, relying on agencies to craft regulations that prosecutors can rely on for criminal charges is 
quite superior to common law development if one worries about the combination of crime-
definition and enforcement power.  In both scenarios, prosecutorial gatekeeping and litigation 
control will bring a degree of influence over effective crime definition that can be abused.  But the 
separation between prosecutors and an agency rule-making process may be far greater than their 
separation from the crime definition process that, to varying extents, plays out in federal courts. On 
one hand is an independent judge tethered to a process over which prosecutors have considerable 
sway.  On the other is an agency that must comply with an open and transparent rule-making 
process, with notice and comment from affected parties,178 and that may worry about losing control 
over law development once prosecutors take a case.  
 
A rulemaking agency will not only be focused on its own equities but will be obliged to adhere to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  Interested parties will be able to challenge a rule’s consistency 
with the asserted statutory mandate or claim policy arbitrariness179 in a process that finds no parallel 
for liability theories generated by courts and prosecutors.180 The Justice Department has, in contrast, 
not shown the slightest interest in offering up its legal theories for notice and comment rulemaking, 
and has taken pains to ensure that litigants can’t rely on internal guidance manuals.181  Moreover, an 
APA rule-making challenge to an agency will be facial, and brought by a party that needn’t suffer 
from the bad facts that are the usual burden of a criminal defendant.  Nor do the functional 
 
177 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. 
L. Rev. 869, 882-83 (2009) (“With his or her power to choose from a range of federal criminal laws, to exercise 
significant leverage over defendants to obtain pleas and cooperation, and to control the sentence or sentencing range 
through charging decisions, the prosecutor combines enforcement and adjudicative power.”). 
178 See Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 745, 755-56 (1996) (describing a shift in the 1960s and 1970s from agency adjudication as the primary method of 
regulation to informal rulemaking due in part to the belief rulemaking was “more democratic”); Lauren Moxley, E-
Rulemaking and Democracy, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 661, 665-72, 690-97 (2016) (arguing that notice-and-comment 
rulemaking promotes participation-based and epistemological “democratic ideals” by involving the public in the 
regulatory process and drawing on its “widely dispersed information power”). 
179 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). 
180 See Roberta A. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Corporate 
America 96 (1982) (noting that in a criminal prosecution “[o]ther regulated persons who will become subject to that 
regulatory policy do not have the opportunity to object to or to comment upon the new interpretation or rule, as they 
would have in a rulemaking proceeding”). 
181 Kahan, Chevron at 497 n.145 (explaining Department’s reluctance to promulgate binding internal regulations); DOJ, 
Justice Manual § 1-1.200 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-1-1000-introduction (“The Justice Manual provides 
internal DOJ guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on 
otherwise lawful litigation prerogatives of DOJ.”); United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014) (rejecting defendant’s 
citation of U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to support statutory interpretation and stating the Court has “never held that the 
Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to deference”); United States v. Holder, 256 F.3d 959, 965 n.10 
(10th Cir. 2001) (giving no deference to the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s interpretation of a criminal statute). 
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defenses of agency lawmaking easily apply to courts, which cannot offer the access to information, 
national uniformity, and flexibility that agencies can.182  
 
Finally, while the advantage of administrative crimes over broad statutes that hand interstitial 
lawmaking authority to a prosecutorial-judicial collective is only arguable with respect to self-dealing 
concerns, it seems certain with respect to due process values like notice and ex ante specificity.  An 
agency’s expertise and civil enforcement experience will not invariably push it to such specificity, 
particularly when it prefers enforcement to rulemaking.  But when self-consciously executing a 
delegated rulemaking assignment, an agency faces a legal accountability that Congress rarely faces in 
the criminal area.183 Digging in the CFR in addition to the US Code is extra work.  Yet the potential 
defendant required to do that by an administrative crime will generally (but not always) find a clarity 
and detail unavailable to the person worried about being charged under congressionally drafted 
statute with a judicial gloss.  In short, the main reason crime-definition delegations to courts come 




As we have seen, broad congressional crime-definition delegations to courts not only flout formal 
notions of legislative supremacy but raise special problems relating to the nature of the institution.  
How, then, ought one assess delegations to not federal, but state, legislatures?   Here again, one finds 
a continuum of contexts in which state statutes provide the terms of a federal criminal offense.  
 
That state law figures prominently in federal criminal law ought not be surprising to anyone familiar 
with the federal history.  While federal criminal law started as a means of “targeting activity that 
injured or interfered with the federal government itself, its property, or its programs,”184 by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, federal legislators began to think of criminal jurisdiction “as 
supplementing local enforcement efforts—supporting local exertions, and compensating for 
local inadequacies or corruption.”185 Initially the federal offense created to support state effort 
deployed a modified common law term, as when the 1919 Dyer Act criminalized interstate car 
thefts.186 But sometimes Congress employed a more capacious term of its own devising, as when the 
1910 Mann Act criminalized the interstate transportation of a woman or girl “for the purpose of 
prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.”187  It wasn’t until 1986 that Congress 
 
182 Lemos at 444. 
183 Note that the Justice Department has never shown the least interest in rulemaking that would limit the liability 
theories federal prosecutors can pursue. See Kahan, Chevron. 
184 Richman, Stith & Stuntz at 3. 
185 Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement, in 2 Criminal Justice 
2000: Boundary Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations 81, 87 (2000); see also Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm 
Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1541, 1548 (2002).  
186 Daniel Richman & Sarah Seo, How Federalism Built the FBI, Sustained Local Police, and Left Out the States” 17 
Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2021); see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 416–41 (1957) (National Motor 
Vehicle Theft Act not limited to “situations which at common law would be considered larceny” because “[p]rofessional 
thieves resort to innumerable forms of theft and Congress presumably sought to meet the need for federal action 
effectively rather than to leave loopholes for wholesale evasion”). 
187 36 Stat. 825, 18 U.S.C. § 398. For cases broadly applying the “immorality” prong, see Caminetti v. United States, 242 
U.S. 470 (1917) (upholding conviction of man who transported a woman to be his “concubine and mistress”); Cleveland 
v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (upholding conviction of fundamentalist Morman who transported a woman for 
purposes of polygamy). 
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withdrew the invitation to courts to judge morality and amended the statute to cover transportation 
for the purpose of prostitution “or [] any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense,” drawing on existing state and federal offenses.188   
 
This state law incorporation strategy would not only alleviate the troubling vagueness of a federal 
definition but would accommodate state laboratories of experimentation189 whose main experiment 
was legal gambling.  Thus, when Congress rolled out its first comprehensive gambling statute in 
1970, it defined an “illegal gambling business” with reference to “the law of a State or political 
subdivision in which it is conducted.”190  Complaints that the gambling statute was deficient because, 
by relying on state law, its effect would “not be uniform throughout the United States” were largely 
brushed aside.191 
 
Arguably even more explicit instances of dynamic incorporation of state law occurred in the Travel 
Act of 1964192 and the RICO193 statute in 1970, both of which created complex federal offenses 
whose elements could, should prosecutors so choose, include violations of specified varieties of 
state law relating to, say, “extortion or bribery.” These statutes made perfect sense as a policy matter, 
since they allowed federal enforcers to selectively take crimes defined by state law and usually 
handled by local authorities and pursue them as part of an “organized crime” project (without, at 
least for the Travel Act, bearing any legal burden of showing a connection to a larger criminal 
operation).194 A similar strategy has been used in the proposed federal domestic terrorism statute.195 
 
One challenge to the Travel Act condemned it as “an unconstitutional delegation of Federal 
legislative power to the States.”196 Responding, a Justice Department official noted that, unlike, say 
the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which entailed wholesale delegation to the States, the Travel Act 
“is restricted to certain defined kinds of criminal activity.”197 Indeed, subsequent years would see a 
line of Supreme Court and lower court cases determining whether conduct charged both violated 
 
188 Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3511-12 (1986); see Michael 
Conant, Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize Prostitution, Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 99, 116-
117 (1996).  Note that Act has since been amended further. 21 U.S.C. § 2421. 
189 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311(1932) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”) 
190 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1955); see G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, 
The Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 923, 979 (1978).   
191 United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 1974). But see id. at 1004 (Ely, J. dissenting) (condemning 
statute because “it is intolerably discriminatory and thus denies to some . . . the equal protection of the law” because its 
sanctions “may be applied only to those citizens who commit their alleged unlawful gambling activities in communities 
wherein gambling is already prohibited by local law”). 
192Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering, Pub. L. 87–228, § 1(a), Sept. 13, 1961, 75 Stat. 498 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1952).   
193 RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. 
194 See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 213 (1984). 
195 See Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act, H.R. 4192 (2019). 
196 Herbert J. Jr. Miller, The Travel Act: A New Statutory Approach to Organized Crime in the United States, 1 Duq. U. 
L. Rev. 181, 185 (1963). 
197 Id. 
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some state penal law and fit within some generic federal definition of “extortion,”198 “bribery,”199 
arson,200 and other Travel Act terms, and they found no need for juries to be instructed as to the 
state crime definition. Concerns about ostensible legislative delegation of federal criminal lawmaking 
authority to states will thus be mitigated when federal courts exercise a gatekeeping role in assessing 
what conduct and which state statutes “count” for federal criminal law purposes.  Federal courts 
may not be democratically accountable, but unlike state legislatures, they are federal. And, at least so 
far, the federal statutes on which their gatekeeping is based has not been deemed void for 
vagueness.201   
 
The gatekeeping role courts play when deciding which state statutes can apply to a defendant via the 
Travel Act or RICO is substantially (but not completely) absent when a defendant in a federal 
enclave is charged under the ACA.202 Here, there is wholesale dynamic incorporation (in the absence 
of a federal statute on point). The ACA provides in pertinent part: 
 
Whoever [in a federal enclave] . . . is guilty of any act or omission which, although not 
made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or 
omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which 
such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, 
shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment. 
 
It dates back to Joseph Story’s dismay that, after Hudson and Goodwin, federal prosecutors and courts 
simply lacked an adequate supply of federal criminal law from Congress to address core federal 
interests.  Failing to obtain legislative authorization for a federal common law of crimes, Story 
complained: 
 
The criminal Code of the United States is singularly defective and inefficient . . . Few, very 
few, of the practical crimes (if I may so say) are now punishable by statutes, and if the courts 
have no general common law jurisdiction (which is a vexed question), they are wholly 
dispunishable. The state courts have no jurisdiction of crimes committed on the high seas, or 
in places ceded to the United States. Rapes, arsons, batteries, and a host of other crimes may 
in these places be now committed with impunity. Suppose a conspiracy to commit treason in 
any of these places, by civil persons, how can the crime be punished? These are cases where 
the United States have an exclusive local jurisdiction. And can it be less fit that the 
government should have power to protect itself in all other places where it exercises a 
 
198 United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 295 (1969) (“[T]he inquiry is not the manner in which States classify their 
criminal prohibitions but whether the particular State involved prohibits the extortionate activity charged.”).   
199 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979). 
200 United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.1975); see also United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221, 228 (6th 
Cir.1998); United States v. Gomez, 801 Fed. App’x. 715 (11th Cir. 2020). 
201 It has been argued, so far unsuccessfully, that the Supreme Court's recent void for vagueness cases, see United States 
v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), require reconsideration of this line of Travel Act cases. See United States v. Rogers, 389 
F. Supp. 3d 774, 790 (C.D. Cal. 2019). Considerable credit for my discussion of this statute goes to Jillian Williams, CLS 
2021, on whose research and analysis I draw. 
202 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).  
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legitimate authority? That Congress has power to provide for all crimes against the United 
States is incontestable.203 
 
Story therefore drafted the original ACA, which Daniel Webster introduced in 1825.204 
  
Initially, the ACA provided for “static conformity” with the state law of a federal enclave: the 
relevant state crime definition was that in force when the ACA, or subsequent versions of it, was 
enacted.205  Then in 1948, Congress changed its drafting strategy, opting for dynamic incorporation 
of state law.  As the Court put in United States v. Sharpnack, upholding the new statute’s 
constitutionality: “Congress has thus at last provided that within each federal enclave, to the extent 
that offenses are not preempted by congressional enactments, there shall be complete current 
conformity with the criminal laws of the respective States in which the enclaves are situated.”206  The 
ACA will not authorize recourse to state law where some applicable federal enactment was intended 
to fill the field or otherwise preclude such recourse.207  But, as Wayne Logan explains, absent such 
preclusion, the ACA effects “a legal metamorphosis,”  
 
transforming “a crime against the state into a crime against the federal government.” Upon 
conviction, the sentence imposed by the federal court is not to “exceed any maximum 
sentence and may not fall below any mandatory minimum sentence that is required under 
the law of the state in which the crimes occur.”208 
 
Before Sharpnack, two lower courts found the ACA’s dynamic incorporation of “future legislation 
constituted an improper delegation and abdication of legislative duties,”209 and indeed pre-New Deal 
precedent held: “Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the States -- by nature this is 
nondelegable.”210  The Sharpnack Court, however, calmly rejected the delegation challenge on 
pragmatic grounds. Vagueness was not a problem: “Whether Congress sets forth the assimilated 
laws in full or assimilates them by reference, the result is as definite and as ascertainable as are the 
 
203 United States v. Press Pub. Co., 219 U.S. 1, 12 (1911) (quoting 1 Joseph Story, Life of Justice Story, Boston 293 
(1851)). 
204 Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 721 (1946) (identifying Daniel Webster as the bill’s sponsor); see also Note, 
The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 Harv L. Rev.  685, 685 (1957). 
205 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 291 (1958); Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 569 (1910) (“There is 
plainly no delegation to the states of authority in any way to change the criminal laws applicable to places over which the 
United States has jurisdiction”). 
206 Sharpnack, 355 at 293.  
207 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 164 (1998); see United States v. Rocha, 598 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
ACA charge based on assimilation of California penal law in a federal prison assault case, on finding that “Congress has 
enacted a comprehensive assault statute by which it has fully occupied the law of assault within federal enclaves”). 
208 Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. 
Rev. 65, 72-73 (2006) (first quoting United States v. Kiliz, 694 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1982); then quoting United States 
v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
209 Note, The Assimilative Crimes Act, 7 U. Rich. L. Rev. 116, 123 (1972). 
210 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (McReynolds, J.); Sharpnack at n.10 (distinguishing 
Knickerbocker); see also Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 139 (2008) 
(citing Cooky v. Board of Wardens,  53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)); Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 629 
n.8 (3rd Cir. 1994) ( “Although [Knickerbocker and similar cases] have not been explicitly overruled by the Court, they rest 
on a strong nondelegation doctrine the likes of which has not been seen since the 1930s.”)). 
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state laws themselves.”211 Neither was wholesale and dynamic incorporation of state criminal statutes 
constitutionally troubling:  
 
Rather than being a delegation by Congress of its legislative authority to the States, it is a 
deliberate continuing adoption by Congress for federal enclaves of such unpreempted 
offenses and punishments as shall have been already put in effect by the respective States for 
their own government. Congress retains power to exclude a particular state law from the 
assimilative effect of the Act. This procedure is a practical accommodation of the mechanics 
of the legislative functions of State and Nation in the field of police power where it is 
especially appropriate to make the federal regulation of local conduct conform to that 
already established by the State.212 
 
Since Congress could undoubtedly incorporate state law piecemeal or wholesale, and “obviously” 
could “renew such assimilation annually or daily,”213why force it to go through the charade? 
 
“To protect liberty,” an adherent to the Gorsuch critique might respond, and indeed that point was 
as the heart of Justice Douglas’ dissent in Sharpnack: 
 
Under the scheme now approved, a State makes such federal law, applicable to the enclave, 
as it likes, and that law becomes federal law, for the violation of which the citizen is sent to 
prison. 
 
Here, it is a sex crime on which Congress has never legislated. Tomorrow it may be a blue 
law, a law governing usury, or even a law requiring segregation of the races on buses and in 
restaurants. It may be a law that could never command a majority in the Congress, or that in 
no sense reflected its will. It is no answer to say that the citizen would have a defense under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to unconstitutional applications of these federal laws or the 
procedures under them. He is entitled to the considered judgment of Congress whether the 
law applied to him fits the federal policy. That is what federal lawmaking is. . . . 
 
There is some convenience in doing what the Court allows today. Congress is saved the 
bother of enacting new Assimilative Crimes Acts from time to time. Federal laws grow like 
mushrooms without Congress passing a bill. But convenience is not material to the 
constitutional problem.214 
 
Why then is the wholesale delegation of federal criminal definition to the States -- once a federal 
court identifies a gap in federal law -- so uncontroversial that even then-Judge Gorsuch could laud 
the arrangement, noting “[a] testament to its efficacy and economy of design, the ACA remains 
today little changed from its original form”?215  Certainly, if one puts aside delegation doctrine, 
disregards the lack of an “intelligible” principle, and uses a grading rubric anchored in federalism, 
 
211 355 U.S. at 293. 
212 Id. at 294. 
213 Id. at 293. 
214 Id. at 299 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
215 United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.). 
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comity, and the traditional primacy of states in criminal law matters, the ACA passes with flying 
colors.  As the Court noted in 1911 of the static version of the ACA:   
 
Congress, in adopting it, sedulously considered the twofold character of our constitutional 
government, and had in view the enlightened purpose, so far as the punishment of crime 
was concerned, to interfere as little as might be with the authority of the states on that 
subject over all territory situated within their exterior boundaries, and which hence would be 
subject to exclusive state jurisdiction but for the existence of a United States reservation.216 
 
More recently, Joshua Divine has embraced the possibility that “a nationally representative body” 
might “conclude that the problem of crime is primarily local, not national, and that criminal laws 
should thus conform to local laws and the facts and needs underlying those laws.”217  Sure, national 
uniformity and horizontal equity across federal districts are regularly proclaimed transcendent values 
within the federal criminal justice system, particularly for sentencing.  But especially since the demise 
of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines (and even before, because of massive variation in 
prosecutorial discretion), such values regularly give way to local norms.218 There is something to be 
said for measures that recognize and formalize the adoption of these norms -- at least to the extent 
that federal enforcement targets the local (as its violent crime work generally does). 
 
Yet unless alternative values like federalism and local consistency are “trumps”219 -- which would 
raise the question of what, if any, other values are also trumps -- one is hard pressed indeed to see 
how the arrangement squares with very real concerns of the sort raised by the Gorsuch critique of 
administrative crimes.  As Wayne Logan notes: By using “state laws and outcomes to achieve its 
own policy ends,” Congress “abdicates its criminal lawmaking authority in deference to individual 
states,” “undermining U.S. political transparency and democratic accountability.”220  One might 
respond that “federal deference actually enhances sensitivity to democratic norms by tying U.S. law 
to decisions of ‘the People’ of individual states,”221 but this “misses the essential point that what is 
lacking is federal decision-making input, which ideally reflects collective national interests and values. 
State laws naturally reflect the distinct positions of state legislators, who are not held accountable to, 
and need not accommodate the interests of, the nation as a whole.”222  Certainly the federal 
accountability of federal agencies is tautologically greater than that of state legislatures. Neither can 
the ACA’s regime find justification in the fact that those charged will also be citizens of the state 
 
216 United States v. Press Pub. Co., 219 U.S. 1, 9 (1911); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign 
Law and the Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol’y 337, 376 ( 2014) (noting the 
“Constitution as a whole expressly recognizes the pre-existing, independent sovereignty of the states,” and “presumes 
the fact and legitimacy of the rule that state law will serve as the primary vehicle for regulating private conduct”). 
217 Divine at 184. 
218 Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds - The Center Doesn’t, 117 Yale L. J. 1374-
1418 (2008); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 
1420 (2008). 
219 See Krent, Fragmenting at 67 (delegations to states “can perhaps be justified by the principle of federalism--the 
constitutional interest in state sovereignty may trump the competing constitutional norm of a centralized federal 
executive”). 
220Logan at 85. 
221 See Krent, Fragmenting at 102 (state legislators “possess an independent interest in fashioning public-regarding laws, 
and are checked by “the state electorate,” which “serves, in essence, as a replacement for the executive branch”). 
222 Id. at 89. 
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whose law applies.223  Maybe they will be, but there is no reason to assume that those who, say, visit 
“Indian country,”224 a military base,225 or are incarcerated in a federal prison226 come from the 
surrounding state. 
 
To be sure, a considerable degree of federal accountability comes from the vast discretion federal 
prosecutors exercise over whether to invoke state law via the ACA. And they don’t do that 
frequently in serious cases.227 Yet that rationale proves too much, as it is true for all federal offenses, 
however and by whomever defined. Indeed, Joshua Divine has turned the vastness of federal 
enforcement discretion, and the paucity of effective constraining mechanisms into an argument for 
extending the ACA’s dynamic incorporation of state law in the ACA to other contexts.  “State 
legislatures, subject to less inertia and politically more distant from the federal system,” he suggests 
“can check enforcement discretion where Congress has not.”228 
 
Absent clarity on precisely what game we’re playing, what grading rubric we’re using, normative 
bottom lines are elusive.  Suffice it to say, however, that notwithstanding its troubling effects -- 
summarized by Logan as “the lessening of democratic pluralism and experimentation, resulting from 
the attendant lack of direct congressional input; the blurring of federal political accountability; and 
the injection of a large measure of arbitrariness into the federal criminal justice system229 -- the ACA 
remains not only quite secure doctrinally, but apparently excused from the terms of the Gorsuch 
critique. 
 
C. Delegations to Foreign States and International Organizations 
 
While Congress has never matched the sweep of the ACA in its delegations to foreign states and 
international organizations, it has given some crime definition authority to those entities.  Perhaps 
the comparatively limited nature of these delegations suggests far more congressional oversight and 
adoptive lawmaking than we have yet considered.  That possibility, combined with prosecutorial 
gatekeeping, could argue for broad acceptance of this sort of delegation. 
 
 
223 See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 13, 19-20 (1852) (“Every citizen . . . may be said to owe allegiance to two 
sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either”). 
224 See United States v. Smith, 925 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining how ACA applies to Indian country under 
the Indian Country Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 7). 
225 See Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155 (1998) (prosecution under ACA for murder of child on military base); 
United States v. Dotson, 615 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (prosecution under ACA for furnishing liquor to underage 
servicemen on military base). 
226 See United States v. Rocha, 598 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing conviction under ACA and California law for 
assault in federal prison because federal assault statute deemed to leave no gap to fill). 
227 See FY 2019 Annual Statistical Report at 11, tbl. 3A (only 132 ACA cases filed in district courts); 32 C.F.R. § 
634.25(e) (providing “[i]n States where traffic law violations are State criminal offenses, such laws are made applicable 
under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 13 to military installations having concurrent or exclusive Federal jurisdiction.” 
228 Joshua M. Divine, Statutory Federalism and Criminal Law, 106 Va. L. Rev. 127, 181 (2020); see also Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 Yale 
L.J, 1920, 1935 (2014) (“The main role states play in federal statutory schemes is as administrators of national programs, 
a sort of second executive branch operating alongside the President and the D.C. bureaucracy.”). 
229 Logan 67-68. 
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Yet this is one area where the Supreme Court has not treated Executive control as much of a 
guarantee of federal accountability in this area. Thus, in Small v. United States,230 where the defendant 
was charged with being a felon-in-possession of a weapon, based on his prior conviction in a 
Japanese court, the Court nodded at the presumption against extraterritoriality, even as it admitted it 
didn’t really apply here: defendant’s possession occurred in the US and the only question was 
whether a foreign conviction could supply the felony element.  But its rationale for quashing the 
conviction focused on foreign offenses for conduct that the US would consider untroubling or even 
laudable, noting that judges and prosecutors would not be up to the job of “weed[ing] out 
inappropriate foreign convictions.”231  It mattered not that, as Justice Thomas noted in dissent, “the 
handful of prosecutions thus far rested on foreign convictions perfectly consonant with American 
law.”232 
 
A lower court drew on Small’s reasoning where an American was charged under the Mann Act233 
with molesting a Russian boy he had brought to the United States for ballet training, with the 
specified “criminal offense” a provision of the Russian Criminal Code that “criminalizes compelling 
a person to engage in a sexual act ‘by means of blackmail, threat of destruction, damaging, or seizure 
of property or by taking advantage of the material or other dependence of the victim.’”234  Throwing 
out defendant’s conviction post-trial, upon finding the Russian offense “too vague to satisfy 
American standards of due process,” the court declined to reach defendant’s argument that because 
“many other countries outlaw sexual conduct which is legal in the United States, including non-
marital sexual activity and sexual activity between two people of the same sex,” the statute was 
unconstitutional. But confidence that federal prosecutors would refrain from proceeding in such 
cases did not figure in the court’s reasoning. 
 
Another statute that might find US courts proceeding gingerly is 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv), which   
criminalizes the use of a U.S. financial institution to launder the proceeds of “an offense against a 
foreign nation . . . involving bribery of a public official or the misappropriation, theft, or 
embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public official.”235 Particularly in nations 
where corruption laws are passed for show or strategic enforcement, such offenses potentially can 
be broad indeed. As yet, however, lower courts have been quite deferential when drawing on foreign 
crime definition in this context, with one citing “principles of international comity.”236 Perhaps 
respect for “international comity,” and recognition of the importance of transborder cooperation 
against transborder criminal activity will turn such concerns into “trumps” like federalism in the case 
 
230 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) 
231 Id at 390. 
232 Id. at 403 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
233 The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, provides: 
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, 
or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that 
such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
234 United States v. Schneider, 817 F. Supp. 2d 586, 602-03 (E.D. Pa. 2011), 
235 Considerable credit for my discussion of this statute goes to Jake Sidransky, CLS 2021, on whose research and 
analysis I draw. 
236 See United States v. Thiam, 934 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Heon-Cheol Chi, 936 F.3d 888, 
897 (9th Cir. 2019) (drawing on Travel Act cases and finding that South Korean statute falls within the generic federal 
definition of “bribery”). 
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of the ACA. The centrality of federalism to the constitutional structure, however, makes that path 
contestable.237   
 
Perhaps because it is more of a regulatory offense of the sort that critics of criminal delegation like 
to target, the Lacey Act has been the subject of far more scrutiny, at least by commentators.  That 
Act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or 
purchase in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, 
or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law”238 -- with 
“law” defined as those that “regulate the taking, possession, importation, exportation, 
transportation, or sale of fish or wildlife or plants.”239 Paul Larkin, a Heritage Foundation scholar, 
calls it “bizzare” “that the world’s oldest surviving representative democracy should give to a foreign 
country the bedrock right that our ancestors, families, and friends have purchased with blood, 
treasure, and honor for more than two centuries,” and he condemns the Act as an unconstitutional 
delegation because it supplies “no ‘intelligible principle’ for foreign governments to use when 
deciding what conduct to make a crime and leaves American importers, for example, bereft of the 
ability to rely on the general legal principles that someone learns in the United States.”240   
 
For their part, lower courts have been remarkably accepting of this broad delegation. As the Ninth 
Circuit noted:  
 
Because of the wide range the forms of law may take given the world’s many diverse legal 
and governmental systems, Congress would be hard-pressed to set forth a definition that 
would adequately encompass all of them. . . . Thus, if Congress had sought to define “any 
foreign law” with any kind of specificity whatsoever, it might have effectively immunized . . . 
[conduct] under the Act despite violation of conservation laws of a large portion of the 




237 A negative variety of delegated lawmaking can be found in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which, even while 
seeking to promote international anti-corruption norms, provides an affirmative defense for payments that are “lawful 
under the written laws and regulations” of a foreign official’s country. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c); see United States v. 
Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
238 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A). 
239 16 U.S.C. § 3371(d). 
240 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 
38 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 337, 340 & 346( 2014); see also Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation Foreign Law, 157 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 115 (2008) (“Dynamic incorporation of foreign law poses a prima facie threat to the democracy of 
the incorporating polity because it takes decisions out of the hands of the people’s representatives in that polity delegates  
them to persons and bodies that are accountable only different polity.”). 
241 United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (O’Scannlain, J.); see also United 
States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the argument -- by fisherman convicted of illegal salmon 
fishing -- that Congress did not intend to impose criminal penalties under the Lacey Act for violations of a regulation 
that itself carried no criminal sanctions); United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1235-47 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
Lacey Act conviction even though (1) the “law” defendant violated consisted of Honduran regulations, not statutes, 
governing lobster fishing, and (2) the Honduran government filed papers in the appeal saying that its prior official 
representations of Honduran law were invalid”); United States v. Hansen-Sturm, 44 F.3d 793, 795 (9th Cir.1995), 
(rejecting claim that Lacey Act is unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority as “frivolous”); Richman, Stith & 
Stuntz at 895-96. 
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Foreign legislative processes are categorically different from State legislative processes. Indeed, since 
the foreign regulations enforced criminally through the Lacey Act need not have carried penal 
sanctions, one cannot assume that any thought was given to criminal responsibility and community 
condemnation. And while federal prosecutorial gatekeeping injects a degree of federal accountability, 
that does not, as we have seen, seem to carry weight doctrinally.  Analogies have therefore been 
made to caselaw constraining delegations to private entities.242 Yet what the Lacey Act has going for 
it are the limited subject matter of the delegation and the inherent demands of a concerted federal 
legislative policy to support international conservation efforts in a way that values both comity and 
notice to those operating (at least initially) in a foreign jurisdiction (even though American 
defendants might not be able to read the foreign laws). 
 
What about delegation to international organizations or conventions? How much of a leap is it from 
a domestic regime that delegates classification, say of controlled substances, to an expert federal 
agency and provides for criminal prosecutions based on those classifications, to a regime in which 
such classifications are delegated by international treaty signatories (including the United States) to a 
group of international experts?243 As with foreign states, these crime-defining authorities cannot be 
held to account as a domestic agency may be through congressional oversight hearings.244 Yet, unlike 
foreign legislation, the US has a direct role in the international process,245 and the involvement of 
other states in that process can provide a needed source of restraint.246 The issue247 has yet to 
squarely emerge, for when a defendant was charged under the Lacey Act with violating the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora248 the First 
Circuit was careful to explain how the Treaty’s provisions had been codified by separate US law.249  
 
Still, delegation to a treaty obligation has figured prominently in the long saga of marijuana’s 
scheduling under the Controlled Substances Act. Soon after it was scheduled, the Government 
urged, as one justification for scheduling, that Act’s provision requiring the Attorney General -- 
without regard to the normal administrative process -- to select the “appropriate” schedule for a 
 
242 Larkin at 403. 
243 See James M. Rice, Note, The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory Authority 
to Private Parties and International Organizations, 105 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 542 (2017). 
244 Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 Md. L. Rev. 707, 738 (2007). 
245 Dorf at 152 (“[P]olitical representation of the dynamically incorporating polity (or representation of its citizens) 
within the polity whose laws are incorporated can compensate for the loss of local democratic control that irrevocable or 
nearly irrevocable dynamic incorporation entails.”).  
246 Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 Col. L. Rev. 1492, 1613 (2004) (noting 
that “delegations of lawmaking authority to international institutions may promote the values underlying domestic 
federalism”). 
247This issue is quite different from the one raised where Congress passes a federal enabling statute, carefully or 
thoughtlessly, pursuant to a treaty obligation. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014); see also The 
Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (implementing statute passed to effectuate the International Convention Against 
the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081); United States v. Ferreria, 275 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 
2001) (upholding prosecution under Hostage Taking Act); United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 80-81 (2d Cir. 
1997) (same); Curtis A. Bradley, Federalism, Treaty Implementation, and Political Process: Bond v. United States, 108 
Am. J. Int’l L. 486, 493 n.46 (2014). 
248 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flor (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 
1087. 
249 United States v. Place, 693 F.3d 219, 222-23 (1st Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Lawson, 377 Fed. App’x. 712, 
716 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a violation of regulations related to the CITES punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 545 because 
violation of regulations was criminalized under Endangered Species Act). 
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drug where “control is required by United States obligations under international treaties, 
conventions, or protocols,” as marijuana was indeed covered by the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs.250 And it continues to cite that Convention as a reason for denying petitions to reschedule 
marijuana.251 The D.C. Circuit has found that the Attorney General has some discretion on where 
she put marijuana.252 but it is far from clear she could refuse to put it on any schedule.253 
 
Perhaps a principle will emerge that international organization delegations of crime definition 
authority going beyond the explicit terms of a domestic statute are acceptable as long as they closely 
resemble the narrow expertise-justifications that even Justice Gorsuch find acceptable in the 
domestic context.254  But, of course, this approach relies on the assumption that expertise has no 
national boundaries, which some -- whether because of their deep immersion in the sociology of 
science or their naked parochialism -- might question.  Suffice it to say that should the political will 
to revisit marjuana’s scheduling develop domestically to the extent that scheduling rested solely on 
the Single Convention, the principles comity and transborder cooperation would be tested indeed. 
 
D.   Delegation to the Law of Nations - Piracy 
 
Whatever constitutional or policy concerns one has with the delegation of crime-definition authority 
to foreign authorities must reckon with one such delegation that dates back nearly to the Founding: 
the law of piracy. Article I gave Congress the power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas..”255  The First Congress exercised this power in 1790 and, in the first 
criminal statute, broadly defined piracy to include what was well understood to be “piracy” under 
international law as well as “a variety of maritime misdeeds” beyond that.256  When Congress 
 
250 21 U.S.C. § 811(d); see United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 351-52 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting government’s position 
that because marijuana was covered by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 
1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298 (ratified by United States in 1967), its scheduling could not be reconsidered); see also Petition to 
Remove Marihuana From Control or in the Alternative To Control Marihuana in Schedule V of the Controlled 
Substances Act, 37 Fed. Reg. 18097, 18,907–08 (Sept. 7, 1972) (denying a petition on the grounds that the Attorney 
General has the sole authority to schedule drugs when U.S. treaty obligations require doing so). 
251 Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,688, 53,688–89 (Aug. 12, 2016) 
(citing the Single Convention on Narcotics for the proposition that “schedules I and II [of the CSA] are the only 
possible schedules in which marijuana may be placed”).  
252 Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Law (NORML) v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 559 F.2d 735, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(“Even under a narrow reading of subsection (d), the Attorney General to satisfy treaty requirements is directed to 
establish a minimum schedule below which the substance in question may not be placed”). 
253 But see Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2019) (reading D.C. Circuit to have held that “foreign 
treaty commitments have not divested the Attorney General of the power to re- or deschedule marijuana”); see also Eric 
Blumenson, Eva Nilsen, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for Marijuana Law Reform, 17 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 43 
n.121 (2009) (arguing that the decriminalization of marijuana possession is, in light of the Single Convention’s 
“consistent with national constitutional principles” caveat, “likely consistent” with the U.S. treaty obligations); State v. 
Kurtz, 309 P.3d 472, 476 n.7 (Wash. 2013) (en banc) Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.203 (2013) (noting, in a challenge to 
a state agency’s placement of marijuana in Schedule I of a CSA analog, that the now-repealed statute required the state to 
mirror CSA scheduling where the federal government acted to comply with treaty obligations). In December 2020, the 
U.N. Commission for Narcotic Drugs voted to recommend the removal of cannabis from the Single Convention. See 
Isabelle Kwai, U.N. Reclassifies Cannabis as a Less Dangerous Drug, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2020. 
254 See supra __ 
255 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
256 Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limit of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. L. Rev. 149, 
175 (2009). 
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revisited the matter in 1819, it changed strategies and explicitly incorporated international law by 
reference:  
 
That if any person or persons whatsoever shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, 
as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders shall afterwards be brought 
into or found in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction 
thereof ... be punished by death.257 
 
The current provision, 18 U.S.C. §1651, is almost identical, save for a mandatory punishment of life 
imprisonment, not death.258 This is one of the offenses charged against some Somali pirates who 
“imprudently launched an attack on the USS Nicholas, having confused that mighty Navy frigate for 
a vulnerable merchant ship.”259 Defendants claimed that “piracy” entailed only robbery at sea, i.e., 
seizing or otherwise robbing a vessel (which they never had a chance to do).  The district court, 
however, found that the statute necessarily incorporated modern developments in international law, 
and, for authority, it looked to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, adopted in 1958 and 
ratified by the United States in 1961, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
which the United States has not ratified but recognizes as reflecting customary international law.260 
Affirming defendants’ conviction, the Fourth Circuit agreed and noted 
 
if the Congress of 1819 had believed either the law of nations generally or its piracy 
definition specifically to be inflexible, the Act of 1819 could easily have been drafted to 
specify that piracy consisted of “piracy as defined on March 3, 1819 [the date of enactment], 
by the law of nations,” or solely of, as the defendants would have it, “robbery upon the 
sea.”261 
This sort of dynamic incorporation regularly happens, the court observed, citing the Lacey Act, 
among other provisions.  As for defendants’ claim that “giving ‘piracy’ an evolving definition would 
violate the principle that there are no federal common law crimes,” the Fourth Circuit backhanded it 
in much the same way as the Supreme Court did in Lanier: This was not a common law crime 
“because Congress properly ‘ma[de] an act a crime, affix[ed] a punishment to it, and declare[d] the 
court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.’”262 And it noted that back in 1820, the Supreme 
Court “unhesitatingly approved of the piracy statute’s incorporation of the law of nations, looking to 
various sources to ascertain how piracy was defined under the law of nations.”263 
 
To be sure, federal courts play a key mediating role when dynamically incorporating international 
norms, thus rendering the “federal” role in crime definition more salient than in the Lacey Act.  And 
the stability of the international law definition of “piracy”-- as opposed to “municipal” definitions 
 
257 Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (1819); Kontorovich supra at 188. 
258 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is 
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”). 
259 United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2012). 
260 Id at 459-64 
261 Id at 468. 
262 Id. (citing Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34); see also United States v. Said 798 F.3d 182, 193 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(following Dire); United States v. Beyle, 782 F.3d 159, 169 (4th Cir. 2015) (same);  
263 680 F.3d at 468 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159-61 (1820); see Eugene Kontorovich, Note 
on Dire, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 644, 648 (2013) (“That a crystal-clear customary definition can substitute for a congressional 
definition has been clear since Smith.”). 
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that are artifacts of national will264-- might be said to encompass a clear “intelligible principle.”  
Moreover, courts can -- perhaps through void-for-vagueness or lenity doctrine -- ensure that 
troubling shifts in the international understanding of “piracy” will not be the basis of federal 
criminal charges. Yet they cannot be counted on to do so, and one might well worry about courts, 
spurred by prosecutors, “cobbling potentially diffuse and debatable international legal sources into 
an open-ended criminal norm.”265  After all, the statute entails less a delegation to courts than a 
delegation to the collectively established “law of nations,” as mediated by federal courts. In any 
event, this legislative delegation to some mix of federal courts and international authorities is about 
as far removed from the model valorized by the Gorsuch critique as can be realistically imagined.  
 
Query which is better: Congress’s original strategy of using its own definition of “piracy,” which 
presumably would have led federal courts to develop the term in their own common law fashion, the 
way they do for “fraud”? Or the strategy it selected, which has federal courts anchoring their 
definition of the term in the “law of nations”? The first makes the offense purely American but 
hostage to ad hoc judicial lawmaking and prosecutorial pressure.  The second is far more stable and 
perhaps ascertainable, but only by using an international benchmark. Of course, neither approach 
has the legislative supremacy demanded by Gorsuch, who would have Congress do all the 
definitional work. 
 
Perhaps a “trump” can be found in the transcendent value less of comity than of transnational 
uniformity in what, operationally, must be a multilateral effort. Should US courts embrace that 
reasoning, they would do well to “consult the numerous decisions by courts around the world 
arising from the eruption of Somali piracy.”266 The point goes beyond operational utility: While 
those decrying administrative crimes are dismayed by the lack of community condemnation,267 there 
is an international community, of which the US and any defendant are members, that stands united 
on so few things. Piracy is one, and the availability of prosecutorial and judicial gatekeepers to 
protect American interests allows sufficient national modulation of that international condemnation. 
 
D. Revisiting Administrative Crimes: A Cautionary Story(?) from Securities Law  
 
Having explored the doctrinal and normative justifications for broad congressional delegations to 
federal courts and to state legislatures, and, through infrequently, to foreign and international 
entities, it’s worth pausing to consider how the delegation of crime definition authority to federal 
administrative agencies fares against a federal criminal law backdrop, as opposed to the 
administrative law backdrop against which the Gorsuch critique places it.  
 
This is not to say that administrative crimes necessarily look bad through an administrative law lens. 
As a formal matter, Tom Merrill has cogently suggested that Article I, Section 1 simply entails an   
“exclusive delegation doctrine,” not a nondelegation doctrine, with two “subsidiary principles”:  
 
264 See Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 334, 335 (1925) (noting piracy “has 
long been regarded as an international crime as well as a crime by municipal law”). 
265 Kontorovich, Note on Dire, at 648 
266 Id. at 649.  When looking at foreign case law, the district court in Dire was careful to note: “While the Court is 
mindful of the controversy regarding reference to judicial decisions of other countries, those concerns are not applicable 
where Congress has specifically chosen to define a crime by reference to the ‘law of nations.’” United States v. Hasan, 
747 F. Supp.2d 599, 616 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
267 See Fissell, supra at 894. 
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First, that executive and judicial officers have no inherent authority to act with the force of 
law, but must trace any such authority to some provision of enacted law. I call this the anti-
inherency principle. Second, that Congress has the power to vest executive and judicial 
officers with authority to act with the force of law, including the authority to promulgate 
legislative regulations functionally indistinguishable from statutes. I call this the 
transferability principle.268 
 
When Congress unambiguously transfers crime definition authority to agencies, it complies with 
these principles.269  Merrill also pushes back against the claim that a strict nondelegation doctrine 
“would promote greater deliberation,” noting “unless we stack the deck by defining deliberation to 
mean legislative deliberation, there is not much doubt that promoting deliberation is a policy that 
more generally favors broad delegation.”270  
 
When one considers the values and pathologies of federal criminal law, agencies come out quite well, 
at least if over-criminalization and fear of excessive intrusions on liberty is a dominant concern.  The 
deficiencies of Congress’s criminal work have been long noted, with legislative specificity poorly 
rewarded politically and concerns about overbreadth generally left for prosecutors to handle (and be 
blamed for).271 Even when a disproportionately affected group has considerable political power, it 
rarely has been able, or even tried, to curtail the sweep of federal criminal statutes.  Business 
interests have largely given up trying to legislatively cut back on the sweep of fraud statutes, and the 
breadth of the obstruction statute -- passed in the wake of Enron -- at issue in Yates v. United States,272 
is a reminder that white collar legislation is as crisis-driven as any other area of federal criminal 
law.273  Agency rulemaking and interpretation offers a far more accommodating sphere for 
“respectable constituencies” to shape crime-definition.274  Of course, if one is trying to balance 
liberty protection against concerns about agency-capture and under-regulation, this feature is a bug, 
but we will stick with liberty concerns for now. 
 
The recent history of criminal securities fraud law, particularly with respect to insider trading, ought 
to give pause to those committed to legislative supremacy as a mechanism for liberty protection.  It’s 
a story that reminds us not only that the actual institutional dynamic across agencies, Congress and 
courts often differs from the idealized one in the Gorsuch critique, but that the dynamic may not be 
amenable to change through the proposed interventions.   
 
268 Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2097, 2101 (2004). 
269 See also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original 
Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 472 (2002); United States v. Palazzo, 558 F.3d 400, 405-08 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding prosecution based on failure of clinical investigators to adhere to the FDA’s regulations regarding record-
keeping and reporting). 
270 Merrill, Rethinking at 2154-55. 
271 See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law? 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 474-75 (1996), Richman, 
Congressional Delegation and Enforcement Discretion, supra note __, at 763-65; Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal 
Justice; Buell, Upside of Overbreadth, supra at 1513-14.. 
272 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
273 But note the absence of white collar mandatory minimums -- Congress’ way of really making a point. See Daniel C. 
Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 76 Law & Contemp. Probs. 53, 56 
(2013). 
274 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2162, 2202 (2002). 
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As Richard Meyer noted, “Insider trading is a textbook example of the process of creating crimes 
through delegation to an agency.”275 The crime-definition story begins with Congress’s passage of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which in §10(b) made it “unlawful” to “use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . .  any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations” as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission” may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors.”276  Section 32 of the Act made violation of rules so promulgated into federal crimes 
punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment while providing “no person shall be subject to 
imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had 
no knowledge of such rule or regulation.”277  This was no wholesale delegation of crime definition 
authority.  As Steve Thel has noted: “While criminal penalties are available for willful violation of 
any section of the [Exchange Act], . . . they are available for only a subset of SEC rules.”278  And he 
reports that this limitation “was the product of considerable legislative attention to widely held 
concerns about the propriety of granting an administrative agency license to create new crimes.”279 
 
For its part, the SEC did little in the way of prospectively articulating the limits of the fraud that 
would be targeted. The agency promulgated a rule, 10b-5, targeting any who employed “any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or engaged “in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,. . . in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.280  Thereafter, in the wake of these open-textured provisions, the work of 
crime definition soon moved to the courts, particularly with respect to insider trading.  Thel notes: 
“The Supreme Court created the law, and, as it typically does in Rule 10b-5 cases, paid very little 
attention to the rule in its insider trading cases.”281  The SEC contributed significantly to doctrinal 
development, but it did so chiefly through the cases it brought and the liability theories it offered.282 
 
This judicial domination understandably provoked calls for greater legislative specificity.  As a future 
SEC commissioner wrote in 1966: 
 
It is suggested that ultimately better law, better national law, can be developed if the effort is 
made through legislative means, with the opportunity it affords for a more sweeping study of 
 
275 Meyer, supra at 1853. 
276 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10b, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
277 Id., § 32, 48 Stat. 881, 904-905 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff).  
278 Steve Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 11 
(2014). 
279 Id. at 13. 
280 Rule 10b-5; see Thel at 6 (noting that the SEC’s general authority to promulgate rules arises out of a different 
provision of the Exchange Act). 
281 Id at 29; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (calling the law of 
Rule 10b5 “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”); Adam C. Pritchard, United States 
v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 13, 14 (1998) 
(“The law of insider trading is judicially created; no statutory provision explicitly prohibits trading on the basis of 
material, non-public information.”); Baer, Inside Trading at 144 (noting how both Congress and the SEC left definition 
of insider trading to the courts). 
282 See Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, Wash. U. L. Rev. 453, 481 (2015) 
(noting “[a]lthough enforcement has been the agency’s primary lawmaking role, the SEC has also responded to 
restrictive judicial decisions through formal rulemaking”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3803618
3/2020 draft – final version forthcoming in 39 Yale Journal on Regulation, Issue 1, 2021 
 
41 
the problems than is possible in the courts. As the law in this area develops, each district 
judge and each appellate judge confronting 10b-5 must become a legislator. Granted, judges 
often perform quasi-legislative functions, but it is suggested that the present state of the law 
permits and invites too great an admixture of legislation with adjudication.283 
 
Securities lawyers and scholars would make similar calls through succeeding decades.284  But to no 
avail, as Congress was unwilling to clarify insider trading law, “for fear that a statutory definition 
would amount to a roadmap for fraud, charting ways for informed traders to circumvent 
prosecution.”285  For its part, the SEC may have resisted specificity less out of fear of providing a 
roadmap, but, as Donald Langevoort has suggested, than for fear that  
 
the political character of the law-making process, so visible and contested, will one way or 
another lead to a prohibition that does not have the scope the Commission thinks it should. 
Special interests often disingenuously seek freedom in the name of clarity.286 
 
As always, the Executive played a key gatekeeping role, deciding when this administrative rule with a 
common law content would be charged.  But it has played its own strategic lawmaking rule as well.  
In the absence of clarity from the Supreme Court as to whether Rule 10b-5 covered 
misappropriation theories of insider trading liability, prosecutors reached for the Title 18 mail fraud 
statute, which the Supreme Court found to easily encompass the conduct.287  And when, in 1997, the 
Court finally found 10b-5 to encompass those theories,288 prosecutors often charged both offenses. 
Indeed, there is good reason to think that insider trading can more easily be prosecuted as mail/wire 
fraud than under Rule 10b-5.289 
 
In 2002, in the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress was in a legislation-passing mood.  So as part 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley package, it enacted a broad securities fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1348. It was 
needed, according to Senator Leahy, because 
 
there is no generally accessible statute that deals with the specific problem of securities fraud. 
In these cases, prosecutors are forced either to resort to a patchwork of technical Title 15 
offenses and regulations, which may criminalize particular violations of securities law, or to 
 
283 A. A. Sommer Jr., Rule 10b-5: Notes for Legislation, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 1029, 1053 (1966). 
284 See Miriam Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 Yale L.J.F. 129 (2017); Donald C. Langevoort, Watching 
Insider Trading Law Wobble: Obus, Newman, Salman, Two Martomas, and a Blaszcak, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 507, 528 
(echoing calls for Congress to “writ[e] a clear statutory definition of insider trading” and lamenting “the unnecessary 
complications courts have caused”). For a recent reform proposal, see Preet Bharara, et al., Report of the Bharara Task 
Force on Insider Trading 14-18 (2020), https://www.bhararataskforce.com/ 
285 Thel at 30. 
286Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1319, 1340 (1999). 
287 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987); see William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire 
Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 220 (2015). 
288 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-59 (1997). 
289 William Wang, supra at 299. 
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treat the cases as generic mail or wire fraud cases and to meet the technical elements of those 
statutes . . .290  
 
Of course, § 1348 added little in the way of specificity. And prosecutors initially had little use for it, 
preferring to stay on the well-trod paths of 10b-5 caselaw.291  But the accretion of judicial doctrines 
designed to separate the illegal use of material nonpublic information from merely aggressive 
research in time limited their ability to pursue the “tippees” who traded on inside information 
obtained from “tippers” under some duty to keep it confidential.  The Supreme Court’s key move 
was to require that the insider “tipper” have received some “personal benefit” for transmitting the 
information,292 and lower courts soon found that requirement unsatisfied in some significant 
prosecutions of tippees.293 So prosecutors switched tracks and found they could side-step this 10b-5 
requirement by resorting to Title 18 (where most but hardly all standard federal crimes are codified) 
and charging under § 1348.294 A Justice Department publication observed: 
 
Bad cases make bad law, and section 10b-5 . . . has spawned a wide variety of cases across 
the circuits which can cause confusion for prosecutors and judges alike. Section 1348, both 
because of its newness and the lack of a civil cause of action, offers a simpler approach, 
without the unwelcome freight which decades of litigation—much of it civil—has piled onto 
10b-5.295 
 
In a case where the jury acquitted on Rule 10b-5 charges but convicted on wire fraud and § 1348 
counts, the Second Circuit recently rejected the applicability of the “personal benefit test” to § 1348, 
reasoning that the test is a “judge made doctrine premised upon the Exchange Act’s statutory 
purpose,” and thus not applicable to the new statute.296 
 
Perhaps this is just a path-dependent story, peculiar to securities fraud, with its high-frequency 
criminal litigation and parallel civil development.  Moreover, as previously discussed, the common 
law-like history of federal “fraud” doubtless contributed to the openly collaborative role the courts 
sought to play in defining an ostensibly administrative crime.297 Yet, with these caveats, one might 
still find the story to show the very institutional dynamics that are occurring, or might occur 
 
290 148 Cong. Rec. S7420 (2002) (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy), quoted in Karen E. Woody, The 
New Insider Trading, 51 Ariz. St. L.J. 505, 528 (2019). 
291 Woody supra at 528 (noting paucity of § 1348 cases). 
292 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983) 
293 See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 422 
(2016); Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 Yale L.J.F. June 129, 139-41, 148–49 (2017). In the 
course of paring back the Second Circuit’s analysis in Salman, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s appeal to the 
rule of lenity, finding that his conduct was within the “heartland” of Supreme Court doctrine. Id. at 149.   
294 Peter J. Henning, A New Way to Charge Insider Trading, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2015; Richman, Stith & Stuntz, at 
883. 
295 Sandra Moser & Justin Weitz, 18 U.S.C. § 1348—A Workhorse Statute for Prosecutors, 66 DOJ J. Fed. L. & Prac. 
111, 120-21 (2018). 
296 United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019).  The Supreme Court recently vacated and remanded this case 
for “consideration in light of Kelly v. United States, [140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020)].”  2021 WL 78043 (mem.) (Jan. 11, 2021). 
But as Kelly does not implicate the Circuit’s “personal benefit” analysis, the latter appears likely to survive, at least in the 
near term. 
297 See Fisch, supra at 483 (noting how “insider trading law is the product of a lawmaking partnership,” in which the 
“Court, Congress, and the SEC have made multiple adjustments and refinements”); Baer, supra, at 138-39.  Note 
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elsewhere. The 10b-5 offense was authorized by Congress, unleashed by the SEC, developed by 
courts, and controlled (in its criminal form) by prosecutors.  Renewed legislative attention simply 
gave prosecutors a new blank slate, with the level and nature of judicial attention yet to be 
determined, and the possibility, as Kim Wooley notes, that a § 10b-5 civil enforcement action could 
be harder to prove than a § 1348 criminal action arising from the very same conduct.298 If the core 
concern of Gundy is “the concentration of power in one branch,”299 one certainly finds no such 
concentration in this collaborative account, save for the usual (and massive) discretion that 
prosecutors have to choose among available statutory options.300 
 
A Gorsuch critique’s gloss on this history would tell of Congressional abdication to the SEC in 
1934, and marvel at how, in 2002, even in the face of a political need for some legislative response in 
response to a crisis, Congress still refrained from serious crime definition work. Would a more 
serious demand for legislative specificity -- effected through a more muscular use of the rule of 
lenity and a more searching inquiry into “intelligible principles” have forced Congress to do better? 
Not without a sea-change in the crime-defining load that the term “fraud” has been allowed to bear.  
One would hardly expect that change to come from courts, which, as we have seen, have embraced 
their definition role whenever that term has been used.  Perhaps we are seeing a combination of 
legislative abdication and judicial imperialism.  But it’s unrealistic to expect that courts, so 
comfortable with their outsized role in this area, would deploy the legislation-forcing interpretative 
canons that Gorsuch would invoke.301  The story of § 1348 is thus an object lesson for those who 
believe that efforts to force congressional attention will be rewarded (as well as reminder that the 




A World Without Administrative Crimes? 
A serious adherent to Gorsuch’s critique could fairly accuse this Article of egregiously leveling 
down.  The Sixth Circuit attack on the sweep of § 242 liability has considerable intellectual rigor, as 
does the longstanding condemnation by many commentators, and sometimes lower courts, of the 
sweep of federal fraud liability. The Lacey Act has its critics, and pirates surely feel unfairly treated. 
Hasn’t this Article cherry-picked some of the worst examples of federal crime definition, and then 
turned around and suggested that administrative crimes are “no worse”? 
 
My response is to deny the cherry picking, and simply welcome readers to the world of federal 
criminal law.  Rather than leveling down, I am merely level setting. Consider a world without 
administrative crimes. Actually it might not be very different (except maybe for the criminal cases 
agencies threaten to refer to prosecutors).  Already when it comes to pursuing environmental crimes, 
prosecutors turn to Title 18 in almost 45% of cases, charging standard conspiracy, false statement, 
obstruction, and fraud statutes.302 That figure somewhat overcounts because the “object” of many of 
 
298 Woody, at 552; see Langevoort, Watching Insider Trading, supra, at 525–28. 
299 Divine at 194. 
300 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979); Stephen Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 537, 554 (2013); Hessick, Myth of Common Law Crimes, at 1015 (noting how overlapping 
statutes effectively “delegate the scope of the criminal law to prosecutors”). 
301 See Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, at 2165. 
302 David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime Redux: Charging Trends, Aggravating 
Factors, and Individual Outcome Data for 2005-2014, 8 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 297, 315 (2019); see also David M. 
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the conspiracy charges was a substantive violation of the underlying environmental statute.303 But it 
understates the availability of Title 18 charges because prosecutors have often been charging false 
statements under environmental statutes instead of the generic 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which punishes 
false statements to any federal official.304 Moreover, instead of charging conspiracies to violate 
environmental statutes, prosecutors could likely charge conspiracies to defraud the government of 
information, since the regulatory violations that are pursued criminally will inevitably entail some 
degree of deception. As the Supreme Court has noted, 18 U.S.C. § 371 “reaches any conspiracy for 
the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of 
Government.”305  A court recently noted: “[C]onspiracies to defraud the government by interfering 
with its agencies' lawful functions are illegal because § 371 makes them illegal, not because they 
happen to overlap with substantive prohibitions found in other statutes.”306  Mail or wire fraud 
charges are also available, when the failure to disclose regulatory violations can be framed as the 
deceit of, say, customers, as one finds in the recent indictment of Blue Bell Creamery’s former 
president for his alleged efforts to conceal what the company knew about Listeria contamination.307 
 
One finds the same pattern in cases involving workplace fatalities that could be pursued as criminal 
violations of OSHA regulations. 308 One observed reported: 
 
In the forty plus years since Congress enacted the OSH Act, there have been more than 
400,000 workplace fatalities, yet fewer than eighty total OSH Act criminal cases have been 
prosecuted – fewer than two per year – and only approximately a dozen have resulted in 
criminal convictions. Historically, [prosecutors] typically have targeted cases in which the 
employers were alleged to have falsified documents and lied to OSHA in conjunction with 
underlying regulatory violations relating to an employee fatality.309 
 
Doing away with explicit administrative crimes would thus vastly reduce the notice and legislative 
specificity of the charged offenses, with the prosecutorial landscape dominated by sweeping statutes 
that, because the federal interests implicated leave no room for constraining federalism canons, the 
 
Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 159, 184 (2014); Joshua Ozymy & 
Melissa Jarrell, Wielding the Green Stick: Criminal Enforcement at the EPA Under the Bush and Obama 
Administrations, 24 Envtl. Pol. 38, 47 (2015). 
303 Id. at 185. 
304 On the sweep of liability under § 1001, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social 
Meaning, 97 Cal. L. Rev.,1515, (2009); Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 
Geo. L.J. 1435, 1468 (2009). 
305 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987); see Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966); Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66 (1942); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924); Haas v. Henkel, 216 
U.S. 462, 479 (1910); see also United States v. Atilla, 966 F.3d 118, 122, 130 (2nd Cir. 2020);  United States v. 
Kelerchian, 937 F.3d 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Rodman, 776 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 2015);  
306 United States v. Concord Mgmt., 347 F. Supp. 3d 38, 47 (D.D.C. 2018). 
307 DOJ Press Release, Former Blue Bell Creameries President Charged In Connection With 2015 Ice Cream Listeria 
Contamination, (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-blue-bell-creameries-president-charged-
connection-2015-ice-cream-listeria. 
308 See United States v. DNRB, Inc., 895 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2018) (upholding misdemeanor conviction of 
construction company for workplace fatality). 
309 Eric J. Conn and Kate M. McMahon, OSHA Criminal Cases on the Rise, OSHA Def. Report (Jan. 22, 2016) (noting 
efforts by the Justice Department to do more in this area), https://oshadefensereport.com/2016/01/22/osha-criminal-
cases-on-the-rise/. 
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Supreme Court refuses to curtail.310  Instead of charging technical statutes that guide lawyers ex ante 
and leave defendants room to maneuver ex post, criminal cases would be about Doing the 
Government Wrong.  And defendants might well face greater punishments, since Congress has 
often taken care to render certain regulatory projects toothless -- as it has by making criminal OSHA 
violations misdemeanors. 
 
Would elimination of administrative crimes change who got prosecuted?  Probably not substantially, 
at least with respect to felonies. It’s already quite difficult for regulatory agencies to get prosecutors 
to take their cases.  Part of the problem is that agencies often lack the resources to investigate the 
serious cases that are less likely to be declined. David Uhlmann reports that “In recent years, EPA 
often has had far less than the mandatory 200 agents, which makes it even more difficult to maintain 
a robust law enforcement program and results in fewer investigations and prosecutions.”311 The 
larger problem is that agencies must compete hard for prosecutorial attention.  The competition is 
most severe in U.S. Attorneys’ offices, which have wide-ranging responsibilities, but even dedicated 
Main Justice units like the The Environment and Natural Resources Division -- which brings OSHA 
cases as well as environmental cases312 -- are likely to look for aggravating factors, going far beyond 
willful regulatory violations. As David Uhlmann recently reported:  
 
Prosecutors continue to focus on violations that involve harm, deceptive or misleading 
conduct, or operating outside the regulatory system—and in most cases look for a 
combination of one or more of those factors plus repetitiveness. Relatively few cases involve 
isolated misconduct.313 
 
Conduct with those characteristics could likely be captured via Title 18, were prosecutors inclined to 
do so.  Indeed, prosecutors would doubtless enjoy sticking with these more familiar statutes, and 
threatening the higher penalties often available with them. 314 Even though Congress chose not to 
authorize criminal prosecution of violations of rules promulgated by the Consumer Finance 
Protection Board, that agency can freely refer egregious conduct to a U.S. Attorney’s office for 
prosecution as mail and wire fraud.315 
 
 
310 For refusals to curtail § 1001, see Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (rejecting “‘exculpatory no’ defense”); 
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68–70 (1984) (government need not prove that defendant knew of federal agency 
jurisdiction when making false statement).  For § 371 cases, see supra note __. 
311 Uhlmann, Redux at 313. 
312 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Departments of Labor and of Justice on Criminal 
Prosecution of Worker Safety Laws (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/file/800526/download.  
313 Uhlmann, Redux at 368; see TRAC Reports, Fewer Criminal Prosecution of Environmental Crimes Under Trump 
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/581/ (noting only 302 new environmental prosecutions in 2019, 
and showing significant and steady downward trend in such cases from 1999); see David M Uhlmann, New 
Environmental Crimes Project Data Shows That Pollution Prosecutions Plummeted During the First Two Years of the 
Trump Administration 2 (October 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3710109 (reporting a 
respective seventy percent and fifty percent drops in Clean Water Act and Clear Air Act prosecutions under the Trump 
Administration compared to the Obama Administration). 
314 One open question is whether the returns to an agency for bringing cases -- measured in perceived deterrence, 
congressional funding, or some other metric -- turn on the use of subject-matter-specific administrative criminal charges. 
315 USAO, S.D.N.Y., Press Release, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Debt Settlement Company And Six Individuals 
For Multi-Million Dollar Scheme That Targeted Debt-Ridden Consumers (May 7, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-charges-debt-settlement-company-and-six-individuals-multi-million. 
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This examination of the regulatory enforcement environment is concededly cursory, and I make no 
rigorous claim that every regulatory crime case that prosecutors want to pursue can necessarily be 
captured via Title 18 charges. Still, three points emerge. First, a muscular judicial effort along the 
lines suggested by the Gorsuch critique that required Congress to do more to define administrative 
crimes would not necessarily result in Congress doing anything of the kind -- except perhaps with 
respect to misdemeanor offenses that lie at the boundary of civil and criminal law.316 Standard Title 
18 offenses would likely capture the most of aggravated cases prosecutors deem worth pursuing. 
Prosecutors can charge those instead of administrative offenses or along with them.  And because 
defendants will generally plead guilty, cases won’t proceed beyond the district court. The pressure on 
Congress to mend its ways would therefore be quite limited. 
 
 Second, any such shift to Title 18 would nullify (for better or worse) whatever efforts Congress has 
made to dial down penal consequences in particular regulatory spaces.  Those seeking more punitive 
responses to regulatory violations might well be pleased,317 but political accountability would surely 
be lessened.   
 
Finally, the self-dealing concerns that so troubled Gorsuch in Gundy are quite attenuated when the 
regulatory agency that defined an administrative crime is not the Justice Department.318 One might 
indeed worry about an agency’s promulgating rules to aggrandize its authority, or reduce its 
enforcement costs, but no rule will form the basis of a criminal prosecution unless a prosecutor 
decides that a defendant’s conduct involves the kind of egregious illegality that would lead a judge or 
jury to think it it’s really a “crime.”  Not only will prosecutors trained on a diet of violent crime, 
fraud and narcotics cases likely have internalized notions of due process that counsel against 
hypertechnical cases against individuals, but they well know that failure is likely unless they can tell a 
simple story of “fraud,” “cheating,” or “illegitimate greed.”  Stories of regulatory complexity are 
mostly likely to come from the defense.   
 
Here, as in so much of the criminal enforcement regime, we see a true “separation of powers 
dynamic”319 -- one that, on the margin, promotes agency (and perhaps prosecutorial) accountability 
and is quite different from the formal one that Gorsuch valorizes.320 No claim is made here about 
the majesty of the federal “criminal code.”  There really isn’t one, and to the extent there is such a 
 
316 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152, 164-69 (2d Cir 2012) (reversing, in light of First Amendment 
infirmity, misdemeanor conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) for promoting an FDA-approved drug for off-label use); 
see John Malcolm, Criminal Law and the Administrative State: The Problem with Criminal Regulations, Heritage 
Found.: Legal Memorandum (Aug. 6, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM130.pdf (citing charge 
as example of “regulatory overcriminalization.”). 
317 See Vanessa Dick, Dirty Money and Wildlife Trafficking: Using the Money Laundering Control Act 
to Prosecute Illegal Wildlife Trade, 49 Envtl. L. Reporter News & Analysis 10334, 10337-40 (2019) (urging Congress to 
incorporate Lacey Act violations as predicates for RICO and the Money Laundering statute, noting the “harsh fines and 
prison penalties,” as well as civil asset forfeiture, authorized by those Title 18 offenses); see also Michael O’Hear, 
Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. Crim. L. and 
Criminology 133, 197-202 (2004) (noting low sentences for environmental offenses). 
318 Even within the Justice Department, a regulatory unit might be quite removed from prosecutorial units. 
319 See Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents at 754; see also Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. (2006); Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship 
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423 (2009). 
320 See Daniel Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, at 53 (discussing prosecutor’s ability to hold police to account); 
Daniel Richman, Law Enforcement Organization Relationships, ch. 14, Oxford University Handbook on Prosecutors 
and Prosecution (Ronald Wright, Russell Gold & Kay Levine eds., 2021) (same). 
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“code” scattered throughout Title 18 and elsewhere, ” it is, in Julie O’Sullivan’s excellent words, “a 
disgrace.”321  Nor is any claim made that federal prosecutors make anything resembling appropriate 
judgements when making matters that would otherwise be targets of “merely” regulatory 
enforcement (which can be quite punitive indeed) into criminal cases. It’s simply that when 
prosecutors do pursue such cases -- using some mix of Title 18 offenses, specialized regulatory 
offenses created by Congress, and administrative crimes defined by regulatory agencies -- specific 
concerns a defendant might have about notice, overreach, and overcriminalization will usually have 
little to do with the legislative genealogy of the offenses charged. 
 
Indeed, one might see administrative crimes as, to some extent, addressing Rachel Barkow’s critique 
of federal criminal law’s capacity for executive overreach, which draws considerable support from its 
comparison of the structural and procedural protections of administrative law with those afforded 
criminal defendants.322  Only “to some extent,” as prosecutors still retain the untrammelled 
discretion that so troubles her.  Yet Congress’s delegation of substantial crime-definition authority to 
agencies -- in lieu of leaving prosecutors to effectively define crime within extraordinarily broad (but 
not necessarily vague) criminal laws -- grafts some of the very structural and procedural protections 
from administrative law that Barkow covets without the need for deploying the formalist separation 
of powers doctrine that she seeks to bring to criminal law.  To be sure, an agency may have its own 
self-dealing issues, which might, say, lead it to craft rules that lessen its proof burden in civil 
enforcement cases. But that’s an administrative law issue, not an administrative crimes one. 
 
The structural separation between rulemaking and criminal prosecutors is not an unalloyed good of 
course.  Were an agency to focus exclusively on its own regulatory concerns and enforcement 
realities, the prospect that a rule might become a basis for a criminal prosecution when violated 
“willfully,” may not be sufficiently salient for it when defining the conduct prohibition.  To the 
extent that occurs, casual (over)criminalization is indeed a risk.  A minor, but still salutary, proposal 
addressing this risk would require that agencies “list and make generally available in full text all 
regulations that carry potential criminal penalties, and perhaps that Congress then be required to 
ratify any such regulation before it can provide the basis for a criminal prosecution.”323 In the same 
vein, an Executive Order issued by the Trump Administration, on its way out, requires, among other 
things, (a) that all future regulations explicitly indicate whether violation of any provision therein can 
itself be a basis for criminal liability, and (b) that future regulations “explicitly state a mens rea 








321 O’Sullivan, supra note __.  
322 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 993 (2006) (“[U]nlike the 
administrative law context, where agencies must adhere to the structural and process protections of the APA and their 
decisions are subject to judicial review, the government faces almost no institutional checks when it proceeds in criminal 
matters.”). 
323 Mukasey & Larkin, supra at 5. 
324 Executive Order 13980, Protecting Americans From Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform (Jan. 18, 
2021), 86 Fed. Reg., No. 13, at 6817. 
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The fate of these efforts remains to be seen.  Moreover, against their potential contributions to 
thoughtful agency deliberation, one should weigh the possibility that, when the possibility of 
criminal prosecutions are squarely envisioned, interagency consultation with prosecutors in the 
regulatory process would ensure that prosecutorial equities and charging discretion shape, even 
drive, agency action.  After all, the mere potential for criminal charges will regularly stiffen an 
agency’s bargaining position even in matters that are likely to remain on the civil side.325 
 
 
Judging Delegations  
 
Having considered a world without them, let us return the “problem” of administrative crimes, and 
of delegated criminal lawmaking more generally. How does one normatively sort through the many 
contexts in which federal criminal law -- although always under the aegis of Congress -- is largely 
defined by bodies other than the national legislature? This becomes an exercise in doctrinal level-
setting, for absolutes are hard indeed. 
 
Originalism offers little leverage on the problem. One need not resolve the current debate on the 
extent to which non-delegation concerns troubled the Founders,326 to see that the Gorsuch critique’s 
demand for heightened scrutiny of criminal law delegations finds little support in Founding 
understandings and practices. Legislators in the Early Republic were quite ready to anchor federal 
criminal law provisions in “the law of nations” for piracy, and the law of states for the Assimilative 
Crimes Act. So too did they freely give courts ample room to fill out vague statutory prohibitions 
through common law development. 
 
The strong version of a separation-of-powers-based insistence on Congress as the sole “author” of 
all federal criminal law counsels the condemnation of every variety of delegation explored here.  A 
weak version might embrace all these delegations, since Congress always sets terms of punishment 
and, as the Sharpnack Court suggested, ought to be excused from constantly revisiting statutes that 
dynamically incorporate the definitional work of another authority.  Indeed, Congress’s regular 
reversion to statutes that delegate considerable criminal lawmaking authority, to increase their 
penalties, recodify them, or make them predicates for other criminal offenses indicates far more than 
passive acquiescence. 
 
But perhaps the Sharpnack license is peculiar to a regime designed to promote federalism.  Given his 
kind words for the ACA, Justice Gorsuch himself may think so.  But how far does respect for state 
sovereignty go. How, for instance, does one score the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA)?327 Even as it provides for an EPA regime of permits for the transportation of hazardous 
waste, it allows the EPA to approve state hazardous waste programs that are equal or more stringent 
 
325 The Executive Order sought to reduce agency leverage in ordinary cases by requiring agencies to issue guidance 
about how they “to administratively address regulatory offenses subject to potential criminal liability rather than refer 
those offenses to the Department of Justice for criminal enforcement,” id. at 6818, but I suspect that such plans, if 
issued, won’t do more than set conversation rules.  
326 Compare Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, and Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the 
Founding (July 17, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3654564. with Aaron Gordon, 
Nondelegation Misinformation: A Rebuttal to “Delegation at the Founding” (March 25, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561062; Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 NYU J.L. & Lib. 718, 729, 778–79 (2019), and 
Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559867. 
327 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). 
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than federal standards.  “When a state program is authorized under RCRA, federal regulations are 
displaced or supplanted by state regulations,” the Tenth Circuit has explained, but EPA “retains the 
power under RCRA to pursue civil and criminal remedies for violations of the state program.”328  
Thus, if federal prosecutors bring a case in such a state, authority to proceed criminally will have 
come from Congress, with the source of law being state regulations, as approved by a federal agency 
that will have persuaded the prosecutors to go forward. 
 
If federalism is a trump, what about international comity and cooperation? While perhaps not yet 
transcendent constitutional values, as US criminal enforcement increasing bumps up against and 
requires the assistance of foreign sovereigns,329 why shouldn’t they gain that status?330 Of course, if 
these trumps are acceptable, the Gorsuch critique loses considerable formal power and opens itself 
up to justifications for administrative crimes that sound in pragmatism, expediency, and expertise. 
 
As Dan Kahan noted decades ago, agency rulemaking offers considerable advantage over what 
effectively has been a regime of judicial lawmaking empowered by common law or just plain vague 
statutory terms.331 Moreover, the risk of self-dealing highlighted by Gorsuch in Gundy and 
recognized by Kahan, is alleviated or even eliminated when agencies other than the Justice 
Department devise their own rules, according to proper rulemaking procedures, primarily for civil 
enforcement.  Note how once can turn around the concern of Hessick and Hessick that agencies 
lack expertise when it comes to crime-definition.332 The story of congressional authorship in the 
federal criminal sphere, for nearly a half-century, has largely been one of reliance on Justice 
Department drafting -- whenever the Department could slip a “fix” into the omnibus bills that used 
to be a staple of criminal lawmaking333 or when it provided material for a Congress looking to make 
a “tough on crime” statement.334 Congress of course has the greatest “expertise” on retribution, but 
that fact is both tautological and troubling, and on even that score Congress’s habit of using criminal 
lawmaking more to loudly condemn than to actually apportion punishment diminishes any claim to 
actual expertise. Weighed against the risks of self-dealing or sloppiness created by the “normal” 
means of crime definition, administrative rulemaking that treats regulation as structuring primary 
behavior in a complex world -- drawing lines within spheres of socially productive activity between 
prohibited and allowed conduct -- rather than providing tools for the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion sounds pretty appealing.  
 
 
328 United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th Cir. 2015). A similar regime is found in the Clean Water Act, 
which provides for federal prosecutions for violations of state water treatment programs that have been approved by the 
EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2); see United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 
329 See Steven Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 340, 346-52 (2019); see also Brian Richardson and 
Steve Koh drafts  
330 See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 Va. L. Rev. 949 (2010); Scott Sullivan, The Future of 
the Foreign Commerce Clause, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1955 (2015). 
331 Kahan, Chevron, at 503-04. 
332 Hessick & Hessick, at 40-42. 
333 See supra (with statutory overrides) 
334 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at scattered titles of U.S.C.); see also 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(f)(1)(B), 123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9)) (overriding United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008)). 
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Note that nothing here resolves the question of how to resolve the tension between Chevron or 
Auer/Kisor and Lenity.335  One need not exalt the rule of lenity as a tool for ensuring strict legislative 
supremacy to hold criminal offense definition to a higher standard than we hold non-penal 
lawmaking.336 The sooner we get past wholesale efforts to delegitimize administrative crimes as a 
whole, the sooner we can get to this somewhat tougher question. Still, those addressing it would do 
well to recognize the advantages of thoughtful ex ante agency law development -- which will 
invariably occur outside the context of a special criminal case -- compared to the relatively freelance 
interpretations prosecutors offer (and courts often accept) on favorable facts.337 Particularly when 
one recognizes the rule of lenity’s spotty record as a restraint on liability expansion,338 the relative 
process advantages of articulated and prospective interpretations by expert agencies ought to loom 
large indeed.  
 
In the end, perhaps the sorry record of Congressional criminal lawmaking in the past half-century -- 
so dominated by a mix of broad statutes passed to address some perceived need for a political 
statement and a regular supply of Justice Department “fixes” -- is itself a “trump” of the Gorsuch 
critique. The accretion of administrative crimes has given federal criminal law and federal criminal 
practice so much more clarity and specificity than it would otherwise have, and perhaps has even 
made it less punitive. Congress’s criminal lawmaking work generally entails a massive delegation of 
discretion to prosecutors and courts (to varying extents), with both driven by the facts of the case.   
If one looks not for community condemnation but real care for “liberty” in the form of well crafted 
legislation (not abstract separation of powers theories), administrative crimes look better and better.  
Indeed those whose chief motivation for targeting administrative crimes is to advance a broader 
anti-regulatory agenda might want to revisit their implicit assumption that the number of felony 
cases brought in service of a regulatory scheme would be any different without administrative 
crimes.339 
 
As an aesthetic matter, administrative crimes and the proliferation of them may be uniquely 
disquieting.  Judicial delegations can always be framed as “interpretation,” the ACA addresses just 
the quirk of federal enclaves, and piracy is a special historically honored transnational crime.  
Administrative crimes, in contrast, explicitly demand that we confront the seeming abdication of a 
foundational legislative duty and the empowerment of bureaucracy.  This Essay’s goal is not to deny 
the power of formalist instincts but to challenge those with them to confront federal criminal law 
not just as it is, but as it conceivably can be. 
 
Since the Founding, Congress has delegated considerable crime-definition authority to a range of 
entities -- from courts to states to the “law of nations.” It is hard to imagine the Supreme Court or 
 
335 See note 37 supra 
336 See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (Scalia, J., respecting denial of cert.) (“Undoubtedly 
Congress may make it a crime to violate a regulation, see United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 519 (1911), but it is 
quite a different matter for Congress to give agencies—let alone for us to presume that Congress gave agencies—power 
to resolve ambiguities in criminal legislation”). 
337 See Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulatory 
Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 42-60 (1996). 
338 See Richman, Stith, & Stuntz, at 97 (on “so-called rule of lenity”).  
339 Some cases now charged as criminal misdemeanors might be pursued civilly, and to the extent that civil procedures 
offer more opportunities to inflict costs on the Government, defendants might thereby benefit.  For an argument that 
overreliance on the criminal charges ought to be addressed by strengthening civil enforcement regimes, see Daniel 
Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 265, 274-75 (2014). 
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lower courts changing that with even the most muscular and repeated deployments of “void for 
vagueness” and “rule of lenity” doctrine.  The issue is not whether Congress will delegate but to 
whom, and what institutional, structural and procedural dynamics will thereby govern some or all of 
the federal crime-definition project.  We have seen the range of possibilities Congress has actually 
used, and explored the distinct set of values promoted or diminished by each delegation and the 
institutional design of the delegatee. The contested nature of those values -- accountability, liberty, 
deliberation, federalism, international comity -- and the ways they interact challenge not just the 
Gorsuch critique of administrative crimes, but push us to think harder about the judicial competence 
to police these delegations.340 
 
340 I owe this final point to Daphne Renan, who, with Niko Bowie, is working on a larger project arguing against judicial 
enforcement of separation of powers law.  Cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2245 
(Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (noting how “five unelected 
judges” had rejected the result of a “democratic process” in which “Congress and the President came together to create 
an agency with an important mission”).  
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